

IDYLLIC STYLES OF PEACE RESTORATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COUNTER INSURGENCY IN WAZIRISTAN

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Abstract

Operation Enduring Freedom launched to punish the perpetrators of 9/11 was soon spilled into Pakistani tribal areas. Thousands of militants from Al Qaida and other groups converted the areas into their strong hideouts and jump-off points for exporting terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan committed its security forces to quell the insurgents in Waziristan in series of major and minor operations with mixed success rates. The research paper investigates the Pakistan counter insurgency operation insurgency and corresponding success of each major operation and factors responsible to their success or failure for the period from 2002 to 2018. The research nature is descriptive, mixing quantitative and qualitative components for contents analyses. The research found that first phase of the counter insurgency operation (2002-2009) did not pay dividends as envisaged. Counter Insurgency strategy of phase II (2010-2018) tailored on the lessons learnt proved to be promising with unprecedented results. The research concludes that hallmark of Phase II strategy were clear, hold, and build and succeeded in winning hearts and minds of the population.

Key words

War against terror, Counter insurgency strategy, Waziristan, winning hearts and minds, Operation Rah e Nijat, Zarb e Azb

Introduction

In response to Richard Armitage's dictates like; "either with us or against us" (Owen, 2002, p2) and "bombing Pakistan back into the Stone Age" (Pervez, 2003, 201), Pakistan felt cornered and choose to be ally of operation 'Enduring Freedom'. Having no choice to dither, Pakistan's 'carte blanche' evolved amid of fear of coercion likely to be

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
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in case of defying Washington (Yamin, 2015). Hence, Pakistan succumbed to all of the seven demands (Shuja, 2008); including sojourning all kinds of support to al-Qaeda; stopping all movements of fuel and recruitments going to Afghanistan besides agreeing to provide territorial access and overflights as well as landing rights to US military and intelligence operations (Sattar, 2009). However, non-availability of any documentary evidence of this understanding gave Americans a leverage to interpret it as per his own suiting.

In synchronization with American attack on Afghanistan, Pakistan beefed up its deployment of forces along the Durand Line, preventing safe sanctuary to fleeing elements of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The relentless air attacks on Kabul and military operation at Torabora forced some of the Al-Qaeda activists and Taliban members to abandon their strongholds in Afghanistan and cross into Pakistani tribal areas in search of safe hideouts. This afforded them the opportunity to camouflage and plan retaliatory attacks on the US, coalition forces and the Pakistani military that was trying to evict them from its territory. Having regrouped and reorganized their ranks and files started infiltrating into Afghanistan and resumed intimidation of both the reconstruction process and the U.S.-led coalition forces on the ground (Nation, 2006). The insurgency turned into armed resistance in 2004 when Pakistan Army geared up its search for Al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan's rugged area of Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan captured many of senior leadership of Al-Qaida their operatives and remanded them to US custody (Zafar, 2005). Pakistan Army's hot pursuit against the militant was assumed as its involvement to the international War on Terror (David, 2006).

The fall out of "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan spilled over into Pakistan with disastrous consequences. Soon these retaliations resulted into emergence of Tahrir-e-Taliban Pakistan, crossed tribal areas into Pakistan's administrative areas, reaching its urban centers and threatening its innocent population, and creating serious security and social complexities for Pakistan. The countdown of terrorist attacks in Pakistan recorded around 18000 plus incidents till 2017 (NACTA). Pakistan suffered innumerable human losses including civilians, military personals, and terrorists/ militants across the time spectrum of the war from 2001 to 2018.

Graph No.1: Wholesome Fatalities View From 2001-2018



Source: NACTA Pakistan’s Database

Pakistan had no alternative but to fight the rogue insurgents and bring back peace and stability in the length and breadth of Pakistan including its tribal areas. The main focus of the counter insurgency operation was required to be in the tribal areas, proving to be an epicenter of terrorism. Pakistan’s counter insurgency efforts did not succeed till 2009 and earned substantial dividends after 2009 onwards (Bundt, 2012).

Research Question: The research paper describes and evaluates the success of counter insurgency operations of Pakistan Army, conducted during the War against terror, with a view to identify their weakness and strengths from 2002 to 2018. The research also intends to find whether the counter insurgency operations were in confirmation with the Kilcullen (2006; 2013) model or otherwise.

Review of Literature & Theoretical Framework

Revolution, coup d’état, and insurgency are the three ways to take control of power by force but different in their character from each other (Powell & Thyne, 2011). The table below attempts to differentiate between the three:

Table 1: Difference between Revolution, Coup d’état, & Insurgency

Revolution	An unpredictable uproar which is short, sudden, spontaneous, impulsive, and unintended, it mobilizes the masses first and then the leader moves in.	France, 1789; Russia, 1917; China, 1948, Iran, 1978
Coup d’état	Clandestine action is a brief and sudden gamble from a small group without involving masses (mostly from security forces), attempted to takeover country governance/	Coup against King Faisal of Iraq in 1958 Coup against President Erdogan of Turkey in 2017

	leadership.	
Insurgency	<p>The insurgency is an armed struggle defined by its purpose and mostly aimed at; seize power or control piece of land from the existing country. According to Clausewitz, “Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.” (Galula, 2006). According to David & John (2008), since 1945 the counter insurgency winning ratio is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31 percent won by government • 28 percent won by insurgents • 22 percent terminated in a draw • 18 percent are ongoing 	Malayan Emergency 1948-1960


Features of Winning Counter Insurgency Strategy:

Elements of Counter Strategy: A winning counter insurgency strategy focuses on “winning hearts and minds of people” in order to increase their sympathizers and reduce the sympathizers of insurgents. Chinese leader Moz e Dong in 1949 said, “The Guerilla must move amongst the people, as a fish swims in the sea. Dry up the sea, or drain the swamp, through hearts and minds campaign and the fish die”. This is possible by ‘draining the sea in which the insurgents swim’ which is outcome of discrediting insurgents among people. The insurgents stay discredits and isolated from the local population if counter insurgency successfully progress through the stages of clear, hold and build. Clear implicates pushing the insurgents out of the area of operations, or dismantling their hideouts and breaking their grip on the local community. Hold is the hardest stage that not only entails controlling ground by own troops, but also involves building public support for writ of the government. The Build stages help involves creating suitable living environment for the local without any fear of insurgents,

and with necessary infrastructure of governance and socio-economic order.

Models of Counter Strategy: Out of the many models of successful counter insurgency strategies identified during the review of literature exercise, following two models are adopted as theoretical foundation for analyzing the counter insurgency operations launched by Pakistan Army in quelling the insurgents in Waziristan since 2001 till today.

Three Pillars Model: According to Kilcullen (2006; 2013), counter insurgency strategy be developed in balance along three "pillars": security, political, and economical. The theoretical under pinning of the model below is “designed as a base (Information), three pillars (Security, Political and Economic) and a roof (Control)” (Kilcullen, 2006).




Source: Kilcullen (2006)

The security pillar entails ensuring population not only socio-physical security but also human security, i.e. protection and provision of human rights including civil and political rights, and free functioning of supporting infrastructure and governance mechanism. The political pillar focuses on mobilizing stakeholders’ support for counter insurgency strategy, downgrade and discredit insurrectionaries; deliver governance and rule of law. The sustainability of political pillar is assured through capacity building of all public and private institutions and social integration. The economic pillar involves short and long terms economic assistance and living programs including promotion and reinforcement of employment generation and economic activities in industrial as well as agricultural sector. The rebuilding and revamping of socio-economic and financial sector should be the

immediate priority. The effective and efficient construction of all three pillars would assist the counter insurgency forces to undertake proper control of the area and its population against the intended plans of the insurgents.

McCormick Magic Diamond Model: The model is structured as a guiding instrument for developing a winning counter insurgency strategy. The model can be used by insurgents as well as counter insurgency forces to turn the table in their favor.




The model entail's four components of winning strategy in insurgency such as; Insurgents, Counterinsurgency force, Population and International community (McCormick, 1987). The success depends upon which side better inter play with other components to turn the resultant trades off in its favour as follows:

- Winning support of local population and discrediting opponent and disrupting opponent support from local population
- Establish own connectivity and disrupt opposing side's relations with the international community.
- Direct action against opponent when isolated from the local population and the international community

Counter Insurgency Operations in Waziristan: An Overview

Since post 9/11 Pakistan Army conducted over thousands of operations (including minors and majors) against the militants with mixed success rate. Pakistan’s counter insurgency operations profile in Waziristan and surrounding areas can be grouped into two phases; from 2002 to 2008 and from 2009 to 2018, as follow:



Counter Insurgency Operations Phase-I:

During this formative phase of insurgency in Pakistan Tribal areas (2002-2008), Pakistan applied multiple approaches ranging from soft, carrot and stick and different political solutions but could not muster desired results. This approach helped militants get converted into large scale insurgency. During the period, Pakistan steered a range of precision strikes and small scale military actions against insurgents especially in North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajour and Khyber agencies. Most of the military operations during the period were reached into “peace deals” with the local militants. The Pakistan Army tried to depict these deals as part of a long-standing precedent in the region (Christian, 2008), however every peace deal resulted into an opportunity for regrouping and reorganizing of the insurgents and later their betrayal. A brief account of some of the main operations launched by Pakistan military in tribal areas as narrated below:

Operation Name	Objective	Results	Success Rate
Enduring Freedom 2001–2002	Eliminate or capture Al Qaida elements Assist in overthrow of Taliban	Captured number of Al Qaida elements Taliban government overthrown	Medium Success

	regime		
Al Mizan 2002-2006	Eliminate/ capture foreign fighters Dismantle insurgents local support network	Captured some Al Qaida leaders but failed in controlling territory Failure of Shakai Agreement Failure of Sararogha Agreement-2005	Medium Success
Zalzala 2008	Clear key towns of South Waziristan controlled by loyal to Baitullah Mehsud	Failed to hold territory; Applied collective punishment that made locals indifferent	Low Success
Rah e Nijat 2009-2010	Clear and hold key towns of South Waziristan	Cleared Ladha, Makin and Sararogha but could not hold the areas	Medium Success

Counter Insurgency Operations Phase-II:

Counter insurgency Operation during the phase I in South and North Waziristan helped Pakistan Army to enhance its operational efficiency. Army with renewed vigor and potency swept away the militants hideout in Swat, Bajour and Mohmand agencies. The operation Rah e Rast in Swat involved managing millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and set new records of success in counter terrorism operations since 9/11. The Operation Rah e Rast succeeded in dismantling, disrupting, and destroying militants command and control infrastructure sand flushing them out of Swat valley thereby setting the foundations of Rah e Nijat in South Waziristan. Pakistan Army with renewed impetus and resolve re-initiated its build-up along South Waziristan border enveloping it from South – East directions. The operation was aimed at eliminating Baitullah Mehsud and his Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) emerged as "the root cause of all evils" in the area. This time counter insurgency force was not only moving in with battle tested standard operating procedures but also with unprecedented public support. The Operation Rah-e-Nijat offensively started on June 19, 2009 by the unified command of ground and air force (Dawn: June 21st, 2009). At the initial stage of Rah e Nijat, in August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, TTP leaders, was killed in a drone attack and was replaced by Hakimullah Mehsud. To revenge the killing of their Ameer and testify their potent viability, TTP unleashed a series of string bombings and suicidal attacks across Pakistan causing havoc on men

and material and spreading terror across the country and beyond. However, the militants failed to deter the resolve of Pakistani forces.

After softening up of the enemy hideouts through air bombing, a ground-air offensive was successively hurled on October 17 that succeeded in encircling and destruction of Taliban forces in the region. Replicating winning tactics learnt in Swat operation, Pakistan Army succeeded with triumph in rough and bloody battles and flushed out the rogue insurgents from South Waziristan, Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai agencies, to Afghanistan (Mullick, 2009). The hard earned triumph in South Waziristan was a clear warning signal of Pakistan deepening resolve against the insurgence at any cost. Having seized major communication centers and towns in South Waziristan, Pakistan Army declared its control over Orakzai and Kurram agencies by early June 2010. The critical outcome of the operation Rah e Nijat and Rah e Raast was that most of the remnants of the insurgents in South Waziristan and Swat sort refuge in North Waziristan thereby converting the agency in to a hardened den. For next few years Pakistan Army focused on consolidating the gains, holding terrain and developing and rehabilitating the area and the people suffered during the operations. Prior to resume operation and expand it to North Waziristan, an attempt was made to give a chance to peaceful means and dialogue.

The Peace dialogue was mandated by All Party Conference in September 2013 to finalize a deal between the Government of Pakistan and banned TTP between the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) government the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to bring peace and end terrorism from the country. A four-member committee from the government and five members committee were announced with a mandate to enter into peace deals between the Government of Pakistan and the TTP (Shehzad & Ghauri, 2016). The talks were still on its infancy that Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan. The killing of Hakeemullah destroyed country's nascent peace process. The talks did not move on expediency, witnessed intervals of stalemates, and bomb blasts and suicidal attacks from the terrorists continued thereby causing delay and making mutual trust a causality (Javaid, 2015). With the militants attack on Jinnah Airport and suicidal bombings elsewhere virtually brought the dialogue process to a grinding halt and Pakistan resumed air strikes in North Waziristan, and launching Operation Zarb-e-Azab formally on June 26th (Shehzad & Ghauri, 2016)

Operation Zarb e Azb

The debacle of the peace talk failure between the Government and the TTP combined with a frightening number of terror attacks led to the hard response in an all-inclusive operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' against the militants last strong hideout in North Waziristan (Javaid, 2016). The operation has to pursue following objectives:

- a. Eliminating the militant groups including foreign fighters from North Waziristan Agency
- b. Protecting the civilian population from the TTP backlash, repatriating and rehabilitating the IDPs.
- c. Ensuring socially viable and economically sustainable livings in the area during post operation environment.

Operation Zarb e Azb uprooted the menace of terrorism without any discrimination of good and bad Taliban, abolished all the militants' sanctuaries in North Waziristan and was continued until the logical conclusion of restoring peace and stability in the country (Munir, 2014). The killing of over 150 students in Army Public School Peshawar on 16th December 2014 converted the operation with true national color, uniting whole nation including all political parties and socio-religious groups rallying behind the Armed forces with National Action Plan. The operation included around 9000 intelligence based operations against militants, resulting in the death of 2763 militants, abolishing 837 hideouts, capturing around 18,087 weapons and 253 tons of explosives. Pakistan Army sacrificed 226 Pakistani officers and soldiers as martyrs (Khattak, 2015). The operation brought relative peace and serenity in Pakistan's hinterland to Pakistani cities, which were previously under an intense militant threat. However, poor coordination with Afghanis authorities in preventing retreating militants in sneaking / infiltrating in to Afghanistan's adjacent areas and regrouping there. (Zahid & Farhan, 2015). Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad was launched on the heels of successful operation Zarb e Azb in February 2017 and continued till today. The operation is aimed at consolidating the gains of Operation Zarb e Azb by locating, identifying and eliminating the traces / sleepers of terrorism and threat of terrorism.

Counter Insurgency: Impact Evaluation


Impact Assessment Phase-I:

- a. **Shakai Agreement** was the first of its kind carried out with the South Waziristan Warlord Nek Mohammad to bring peace in

the area. The deal compensated the insurrectionaries for their losses but did not entail them to pay compensation to their victims. The insurgents were not asked to surrender but were allowed to keep their arms. The deal was described as a 'reconciliation', which helped insurgents earn political acceptability and facilitated them to consolidate their hold over South Waziristan. The agreement called for tribal to produce foreigners hiding there and ensure their registration, but soon they defaulted and Nek Muhammad was soon killed by an American missile.

- b. **Saraogha Agreement** signed with Baitullah Mahsud with the mediation of Maulana Fazl ur Rehman of JUI. Abdullah Mehsud was also made bound not to attack Pakistan Army and not to shelter foreign militants. However, Abdullah Mehsud was neither asked to lay down arms nor to stop attack US forces across Durand line. The agreement did not entail Abdullah to surrender foreign militants supposedly taking refuge with him; America demanded killing or capture of foreign militants in Waziristan instead of offering amnesty through peace accords. The operation success entailed capturing or killing of several al-Qaeda leadership including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Abu Zubeida and Abu Talha al-Pakistani.
- c. Pakistan counter insurgency contingents were composed of Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps with selective intelligence and administrative support of American forces. The counter insurgency operations during the period couldn't clear Waziristan of local and foreign militants. Operations were mainly marked by sweep and search raids and did not sustained in holding territory. When seen in overall outcome, this phase of the counter insurgency operations proved to be nearly counterproductive, helped Pakistani Taliban to make substantial inroads in grabbing power of tribal chieftains and increasing influence of the mullahs espousing Taliban worldview. The government's initiatives were also hindered by conservative religious parties operating in the tribal areas. These groups considered government efforts against Al-Qaeda and other groups an 'American war'. The operations resulted in to a huge displacement of local population including men, women and children.
- d. **Terrorism Profile:** Despite counter insurgency operation, the terrorism profile raised on an unprecedented rate every year.

The graph below depicts the figures of terrorism incidents occurred with corresponding rate of fatalities Pakistan suffered in the same year.



- e. The counter insurgency operations conducted in Waziristan from 2001 to 2009 entailed mixed success rate ranging from low to medium due to the following reasons:
- i. Inadequate capacity of Pakistan Army to fight insurgency, clear and hold areas, win and sustain the support of locals against the militant colored with Islamic Jihadi (Christine & Jones, 2009).
 - ii. Lack of training, equipment and doctrinal deficiency suitable to fight counter insurgency operations for a prolonged period of time against hardened elements resisting in difficult mountainous terrain (Jones & Fair, 2010). According to Shuja (2009) “Both, the Frontier Corps and the Army, operated with severe handicaps: poor training for counterinsurgency warfare and poor equipment for the highly mobile war against the militants.”
 - iii. The confusion and indecisiveness between “good” and “bad” jihadies or Taliban strained Pakistan’s Military and social fabric until the state found its survival endangered from these erstwhile proxies (Christine & Jones, 2009)
 - iv. Pakistan has never spelt out its internal security policy, thereby devoid of any well-defined internal security objectives, strategies and policy etc. Therefore, all the

- security operations conducted during the period were without any policy parameters.
- v. Cadres of Frontier Corps (FC), the main fighting force in FATA, recruited locally, were reportedly found sympathizers for Taliban (Christine & Jones, 2009).
 - vi. Al Mizan, especially in South Waziristan, demonstrated serious deficiencies in conducting cordon-and-search operations and holding territory. Troops were found unable to integrate operations with local tribes.
 - vii. Poor governance mechanism of the civil administration in tribal areas over the years resulting into lawlessness and nonexistence of security operators to control and spot the sleeping cells of insurgents or identify rogue elements. Role and competency of police and the quality of intelligence have historically affected the success - or failure - of counterinsurgency efforts.
 - viii. Pakistani society was polarized between “for and against” camps of Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan Government failed in mobilizing the nation against the militants’ threat and developed an anti-militants narrative to be rallied behind. It was 2009 onward when general public started uniting against the terrorists and their philosophy and 16 December 2014, the massacre at Army Public School Peshawar, provided an anchorage to the nation to stand up and rallied behind the security forces against the terrorists wherever they were.

Impact Assessment Phase-II


Counter Insurgency Operation conducted from 2010 onwards were better conceived, thoroughly coordinated and meticulously conducted. When analyzing the planning and conducting phase of the second phase counter insurgency strategy, it is observed that the strategy is correctly evolved around:

- a. The principle of “winning the hearts and minds” of local population. Winning of hearts is reflected from the policy of persuading people that their best interests are served by Counter insurgency. This persuasion was supported by the local population experience from the success of operation Rah e Rast in Swat, evacuation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their maintenance in their camps. Winning of minds was reflected out of people perceptions that Pak Army is capable of


- protecting their socio- economic and political rights and government can ensure delivery of services and governance.
- b. The second phase operation strategy was rational progression of clear, hold and build stages of the operation. The missing stages of “hold” and “build” from phase I operations was successfully dove tailed in 2nd phase. The Army and the FC were adequately equipped and trained for fighting the insurgency battles in rugged mountain terrain and hold the areas after cleared from the militants. US help Pakistan to enhance its capacity in terms of equipment and training which was weak link during phase-I.
 - c. Promulgation of National Internal Security Policy in 2014 incorporated both soft and hard approach as part of counterinsurgency with following principles to follow:
 - i. Involving all stakeholders in dialogue and communication.
 - ii. Establishing relations and networking with the local population to deprive terrorists from their support.
 - iii. Capacity-building of the security forces through training and equipment to enable the security apparatus to neutralize threats to internal security.
 - d. The soft approach of the counter insurgency strategy entailed initiation of dialogue to bring negotiated peace in the area. Tahrik e Taliban reluctant approach to dialogue and continuing terrorists’ attacks simultaneously on national nerves and communication centers delineated the militants’ sympathizers thereby isolating them from the public support.
 - e. Success in Operation Rah e Raast induced confidence and self-efficacy amongst the ranks and files of counter insurgency force which was shaken during the phase I operations. Prior to every operation, the local population was brought in the operational loop disrupting their networking with the insurgents. This was done by overcoming the fear of insurgents through communication and inducements. Therefore, in most of the operations the insurgents were lacking any support from the locals and were forced to fight or flight at their own resources.
 - f. Army operations were backed by all of the political parties support. 16th December APS Peshawar incidence garnered public support against the militants and maximized the need for expediency. Pak Army exploited this unity and emotional support to its fullest during the operation Rah e Nijat and Operation Zarb e Azb.
 - g. Public-private partnerships and international economic and political support for the IDPs facilitated counter insurgency in

winning hearts and minds of the local population and quicken their repatriation and rehabilitation phase in their home towns.

- h. The rebuild stage of each built-up area was clearly spelled out in the operation plan and time and resources were made available.
- i. The militancy affected youth was put through psychological rehabilitation and social integration process and soon absorbed into the community as its useful members.
- j. Civil administration and Frontier Constabulary was integrated in the final stage of the operation to take over post operation consolidation and ensure delivery of social services like health and education with improved governance system.
- k. Construction and improvement of education and health infrastructure, road network, social activities and deployment of civil administration and policing components were given due importance in the “build” phase of the operation.
- l. NAP was given special attention simultaneously to revive public confidence and win their hearts and minds. NAP has occupied central position in Operation Rad ul Fasad in nurturing hatred free and tolerance Pakistan.
- m. The real-time outcome of the counter insurgency operation is clearly demonstrated from the consistent decline of the terrorism profile landscape in the country. The chart below suffices to explain that how rapidly terrorism profile is controlled to its lowest point in 2018.



To draw clear impact assessment between the phase I and II operations, the graph below can help to gauge the success of operation in year wise terrorism profile from 2002 to 2018.



Source: NACTA Database

The above graph reflects that the terrorism impact in term of terrorism incidents and corresponding human losses stretched its peak in 2010, over 120000 incidents guzzling 2061 precious lives (in 2010) and having a nosedive in 2014, as a result of *Zarb-e-Azb* and NAP. In 2015 terrorism incidents dropped from an average of almost 5/ day (2014) to almost 1/ day (2017) and in 2018 the terrorism profile came at negligible rate (NACTA Database).

Conclusion

The character of counter insurgency operation and general war is different and calls for matching levels of training and preparedness. Pakistan Army, despite its profession commitment and high degree of motivation, could not deliver initially in counter insurgency due to its deficiencies required for the operation. Counter insurgency operation from 2002 to 2009 testify that Pakistan Army gradually developed its competencies and skills and it was found more potent outfit after it was equipped and trained from the American forces. Furthermore Pakistan Army operational doctrine had missing link in its operational doctrine. Introduction of its first counter insurgency operations helped Pakistan Army to develop appropriate counter insurgency strategy. The new strategy simultaneously evolved around soft and hard approach. Soft

approach help to win hearts and minds of population and alienate the militants from their public support. The second phase of the operations demonstrated that success in counter insurgency is anchored with holding areas and build approach. It also demonstrated that insurgency operation cannot be won with polarized population, rather unite nation with commonality of agenda leads to victory point. alienate must draw their strength from national policy co Pakistan's The National Counter-Terrorism The lessons learnt from successful operation suggest that insurgencies are defeated by military force but it is retained and consolidated by the civil administration. The critical phase to sustain the winning counter insurgency hinges around rebuilding and rehabilitation of the area and the people.

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