


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# PAKISTAN

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**Title Picture:** A Buddhist monastery in Takht-i-Bhai, District Mardan-Pakistan

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## PAKISTAN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (RCD): A CRITICAL REVIEW

Farrukh Faheem<sup>1</sup>

Wang Xingang<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

*Islamic identity and safeguarding its economic interests were the main objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy overture towards the Muslim world. To achieve these goals Pakistan advanced the idea of the (Regional Cooperation for Development) RCD. Two other Muslim states, Iran and Turkey had a lukewarm attitude with the basic idea of a Regional organization. Iran and Turkey were not only reluctant to join this organization but the western powers also had apprehensions about the concept of RCD. Western powers had reservations that having already CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) another organization will also be redundant in its existence. Both Iran and Turkey wanted to build RCD without deserting the Western bloc, which they considered vital to safeguard their long terms interests associated with CENTO. To dispel the West's reaction towards RCD in already existing arrangements of CENTO, member countries propagated that this would be an economic and developmental organization among the co-religion states. But for Pakistan RCD was a multipurpose platform that retains its Islamic identity, makes a choice in foreign policy and gets rid of the impression of western tutelage. Similarly, Pakistan was shocked by the Western allies' overtures towards India, after its defeat to China in the 1962 border clashes. Pakistan was looking for new friends to counterbalance this situation.*

**Key Words:** Identity, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, CENTO, RCD, Middle East

### Road to RCD\*

Pakistan was carved out from the demise of colonial Raj in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. The end of the colonial era not only re-defined territories but also redistributed the power structures between the

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\*RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) was a security cum economic arrangement among three Muslim states, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964. These countries were not satisfied with CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) a US-sponsored defense pact for Asian countries to counter the communist influence in the region.

retired empires and the new states. Newborn states in the pursuits of identity and interests restarted the old game of gain according to their political paradigms.

The same was the approach of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey when they formed RCD. RCD meant to them a kind of pan-Islamism between non-Arab regional Muslim states. “The growth of regionalism in the developing world is a pragmatic and realistic response to the crisis of “demand input overload” (David, 1965, p.58). This was regional cooperation between co-religionist countries to rebuild their identity and interests according to the new needs. By initiating RCD, Pakistan also wants to cease its immediate colonial past and to safeguard its territorial integrity. Islam suits Pakistan in all aspects, it got independence on the slogan of separate Muslim land, therefore Pan-Islamism had a wider appeal for Indian Muslims and it dates back when they regarded Ottoman Caliphate as a symbol of religious unity and political Islam, thus Islam became the cornerstone of its domestic and foreign policies. In its formative years Pakistan tried to make an Islamic alliance with the Arab world, but on the other side found no keen response. But despite this Pakistan did not stop its quest to make an association with the Muslim countries.

Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran can be distinguished from the other Middle Eastern Muslim countries in many aspects. The following three countries are non-Arabs, their contiguity with the Soviet Union, and excluding Pakistan's other two have not been colonized. Turkey (the previously Ottoman empire disintegrated, before and after the First World War) and Iran (with a large territory that too bifurcated, see, ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Turkmenchay\\_1828](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Turkmenchay_1828)) much influenced by the West expansionist design that ultimately tore them into pieces. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey enjoy a close relationship with the Western world (Iran's path changed after the 1979 Islamic revolution) afterward they sought new national governments. “However, Among Asian countries, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey can, in a way, be regarded as pioneers in the field of regional cooperation”. (Hashmi, 1973)

In the new international system that emerged after the 2nd world war, the Western countries hold the center of power. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey experienced nationalist movements and modernization in their countries. Other than their religious ideological link, they had bilateral and joint defense pacts under Western power's auspices. Post-War developments forced these states to seek mutual defense as well as

nondefense agreements on regional as well as extra-regional levels that the cold war environment imposed on them.

Both Iran and Turkey had direct threats from Soviet expansion, to avert this danger they signed the Saadaabad Pact of July 1937, while Pakistan joined them after independence via Baghdad pact in 1955. "The idea of regionalism had historic roots among the northern countries of the Middle East. As early as 1937 the states of the Turco-Iranian plateau had recognized a certain identity of interests, in the Saadabad pact, concluded by, Iran, Iraq, Turkey (Gale archives, 2020), and Afghanistan to make new alliances and friends which could help them in grappling with their problems.

Whereas Iran and Turkey had issues with the Soviet Union, Pakistan needed help to contain the Indian's pressure through this agreement. Over time, all three countries and especially Pakistan started believing in the Baghdad pact (latter CENTO, when Iraq left it after a bloody coup) as a weapon that they cannot use against their adversaries. These defense pacts with the West further restricted the ability of the three Muslim countries to defend themselves against any aggression. "Modern, Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani relationship was a series of 'marriages of convenience' CENTO and then it's economic off-shot Regional Cooperation for Development, RCD." (Bishku, 1999, p. 13-28).

In this situation, Pakistan was desperately looking for an organization with the Muslim countries to satisfy its identity needs and foreign policy shortcomings. To materialize this dream, the President of Pakistan visited Turkey, Tehran, and Kabul to muster favor of these countries to form a new regional organization of the like-minded Muslim States. In their joint statement, the heads of these three states declared "that regional cooperation is an essential factor in accelerating the pace of national development" (Pakistan Document Series, 1964).

The idea of RCD was floated in tripartite meetings held among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey's foreign ministers to discuss the proposed organization's salient features. On July 3rd, President of Pakistan Ayub Khan suggested that the "conclusion of a formal pact between the three regional members of CENTO: Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran (DO, 1964). The foremost goal of the new organization was to stimulate, economic, cultural, and technical cooperation amid the three states, besides the framework of CENTO. The name of this organization was



recommended, Regional Cooperation Organization for Development (RCD).

With the formation of RCD Pakistan's relationship with the Muslim world, especially with regional Muslim countries was further strengthened. Islam was very much in the consciousness of Indian Subcontinent Muslims; therefore Pan-Islamism had a wider appeal for Indian Muslims and it dates back to when they regarded Ottoman Caliphate as a symbol of religious unity and political Islam. After independence, Pakistan's Islamic character and cordial relationship with Middle Eastern Muslim states became an important and constant factor in the country's foreign policy. But, on the contrary, the often reiterated metaphor of Pan-Islamism failed to impress Pakistan's other counterparts in the Muslim world.

It was a long-sought desire of Pakistan to complete its identity destination. Islamic episteme is the *raison d'état* of the State of Pakistan. Islam transformed the Politico-Religious desire of the Indian Muslim under the British Colonial Raj into State building endeavor. This was quite a different political struggle for national emancipation than other freedom movements, where ethnicity or language was the main driving force. On the contrary, in the Pakistan movement, religious orientation (two-nation theory) was the *sine qua non*.

Pakistan stood out in the community of nation-states as being a state formed solely based on religious identity-with neither ethnic nor territorial integrity (Ed. Svante, 2009, p, 291). This identity search landed safely with the formation of RCD "Pakistan's relations with the non-Arab countries of the Middle East were further cemented by the establishment in 1964 of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) between Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran (FCO, 1967). Since all three countries have some reservations with the CENTO performance. "Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan had enough experience with CENTO to have arrived at some fundamental conclusions regarding the ability of the alliance to satisfy certain of their basic interests (Gale archives, 2020). Those Interests are, Pakistan had concerns regarding the West increasing tilt towards its arch-rival India, and their silence on the Kashmir cause. While Turkey was disturbed over the Cyprus issue and Iran was anxious over the bloody coup in Iraq.

This was also admitted by the USA State Department in their official correspondence, in one secret cable it was observed that "Pakistan was deeply disappointed at the USA and UK to support for

India the 1962 confrontation with China. Turkey felt let down by this same CENTO (and NATO) allies in the 1963 Cyprus crisis. Iran was frequently disappointed by British and American Arab policies (Gale archives, 2020). But all three were indisposed to lead any new political adventure that could cause resentment of the West against them. However, Pakistan's unrelenting demand leads them towards building a private alliance, RCD. Nonetheless, they did it with a cognizant approach, not to disenchant their friendship with the Western countries.

### **Identity and Interests**

For Pakistan, RCD was much more than just an organization. "Pakistan was particular, wished to improve relations with the Soviet Union, and its other neighbor. However, the tie with CENTO made moves in this direction more difficult (DO, 1964). Pakistan since its establishment was in search of Identity formation. One such attempt to appease the Arab world was gone sour, due to the notion on the part of the Arab states that Pakistan was interested in acquiring a leadership role. In 1958, Pakistan's, a civilian government was replaced by the army in a coup. The new army regime under General Ayub Khan tried to overhaul the domestic and foreign policies of the state according to his political design. Being a self-proclaimed modernist who has a firm belief in the development of the country, he started a reformed program in state institutions. On one occasion, the President of Pakistan, General Ayub appealed to the county's powerful clergy and encouraged them to "interpret Islam in ways that would help the country's development agenda" (Behcet, 2009, p. 642).

The new Pakistani regime has another task to accomplish, to ascertain the identity of the state. "The state did not, however, adopted a clear policy regarding Islam until 1958 when the military under the command of General Muhammad Ayub Khan took over and proceeded to resolve many of the anomalies that had confounded state formation" (DO, 1964) For Pakistan RCD was a panacea for most its predicaments. It could end its wandering for identity search, mitigate its economic difficulties, and provide its defense umbrella against regional adversaries. "The factors which contributed to the success of RCD can also be counted for its establishment. Identity of faith, geographical contiguity, harmony in political outlook, powerful cultural affinity, and a common historical background are some of the numerous factors which unite these states" (Behcet, 2009, p. 640). Besides Pakistan, no other member state of RCD was passionate to devise another

organization when they had other options as well; but they had to surrender before Pakistan's wish due to many factors.

### **Achievements of RCD**

In spite, is not being a formal military organization, its leadership, promised to help each other in times of crisis, and they reiterated this commitment on various occasions. For example, the Shah of Iran told to Pakistan that they have a shared destiny and they have "to stand by you in good and bad days" (Morning News, 1967). These were not hollow statements but in reality, when Pakistan had bad days with India over the war of 1965 and 1971, Iran helped Pakistan. Similar pledges were showed by the Turkish authorities, Turkey President Cevdet Sunay said that "Turko-Pakistan relations had reached a level of far above of those alliances" (Dawn, 1967) Turkey also supported Pakistan, morally, militarily, and financially during both wars. By and large, RCD remains a developmental organization, and by the end of 1970, it completed 13 different, industrial projects. "RCD is fundamentally a "micro-regional economic organization and its main objective is to accelerate the process of economic development" (Nye, 1971, p. 21-54). RCD was an attractive organization; many sectors could be exploited for the betterment of the following countries masses "the economic achievements of RCD were modest" (Gale archives, 2020). But it was unsuccessful to achieve any substantial growth in trade and development among the member states. It can be used for internal stability and development within the territories of its members that could be a role model for other regions. It might be a future like the EU, but it failed to attain its goals. "The RCD Planning Council, "studies the development plans and production potentials of the countries of the region. It makes proposals regarding the harmonization of the national development plans in the wider interest of accelerated regional collaboration" (Government of Pakistan, p. 3). Most principles of the RCD were acceptable to everyone because there was no formal agreement on security and political engagements. Perhaps the most tangible and practical forum that so far Pakistan gained in its relationship with the Muslim world was the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Because in the past "Pakistani overtures to the Arabs had not been reciprocated" (Gale archives, 2020). This might be the outcome of the non-Arab Muslim countries distancing themselves from the Arab world to create their group. They were also frustrated with the CENTO, which failed to fulfill their rudimentary requirements of security and economic development. A consequential result of the earlier failed pacts was a developmental and Economic organization

was the need of the time. The main idea behind RCD was to speed up domestic growth, as well as development through the dynamic and continued regional partnership among the member states. In this regard, RCD's communiqué affirmed that "the new organization would operate without damaging its members, activities within other regional organizational" (Behcet, 2009, p. 644).

The international environment at that time was furthermore viable for regional alliances. It was also because America and Russia were edging towards normalization, which reduces the importance of military pacts. Although, RCD was not a military pact, apparently to appease big powers for any objection in the formation and to attract alienated Muslim countries to make them a part of this pact. RCD countries aim to engage other regional Muslim states in the organization. Among those states, Afghanistan was on the priority list to include in the organization.

RCD makes it clear that it will welcome "the members would be open the consideration of the participation of other regional countries" (FCO, 1967). For this purpose, Afghanistan was a natural choice, its proximity, being a Muslim country, and being in the vicinity of Russia that all fulfilled the basic criteria that it should be a part of RCD. "The first suggestion that Afghanistan should join the new grouping was made by President Ayub Khan, when he paid a formal visit to Kabul, en route to Tehran and Ankara, early in July 1964" (FCO, 1967) but they decline to be a part of RCD because they thought "Pakistan had strongly hoped that Afghanistan would accede, but RCD seemed to close in appearance to CENTO" (Gale archives, 2020).

But Afghanistan was much conscious about RCD formation. It still has to apprehend the real motive of RCD. Again, it did not want to dispel any impression, both to Russia and America about its commitment to any regional or global arrangements. In this regard, the British ambassador to Kabul, assessment report was quite appropriate, he reported that "Afghanistan did not want closer practicable ties with Iran and Pakistan on RCD" (FCO, 1967) There were many reasons for what Afghanistan stay away from formally joining RCD. It doesn't want to lose its neutrality gestures in diplomacy; again its internal affairs were not suitable for new regional alignments. It also doesn't want to instigate its powerful neighbor Soviet Union's wrath against it and last but not the least "The Pashtunistan problem is still at least formally an issue with Pakistan" (DO, 1964) and has much reservation to be a partner of Pakistan in any regional alliance. However, in such an

odd situation, still, there was a hope that Afghanistan might sometimes join the group. It all depends on RCD's performance and direction "If RCD manages to build up a reputation both for success and independence of the West" (FCO, 1967) other nations might join it.

There are many scopes for further collaboration among these three countries that CENTO missed to achieve, because of the misunderstanding and divergence of interests among the members. The main objectives of RCD that were propagated were "to collaborate on national projects in the fields of communications, agriculture, industry, mineral resources, education, health, regional development and to strengthen this collaboration by technical cooperation" (DO, 1964) failed to realize. Because RCD countries tried to convince the non-Arab Muslim countries and particularly Afghanistan that was a natural part of this regional design. But they failed to win the Afghan government's trust. The Arab states saw this agreement, an extension of imperialists disguise to overthrow the rising forces of Arab unity" (Burke, 1991, p.306)

### **Problems between the Partners**

There were some cleavages among the RCD partners that were not so visible but create hindrances in the performance of the organization. Shah of Iran was young and an ambitious monarch but at the same time a frightened member of the organization. He was vigilantly looking at all the movements of the regional players that might be a threat to his political future. "Nevertheless, it has created a regional sub-system within which the member states make decisions by way of "splitting the differences" (Ernst, 1966, p.100).

In this regard, he was fearful of Arab Ba'ath party antimonarchy rhetoric. He was still in the trauma of regime change in Iraq. This ousted the government in a bloody coup. In RCD he saw a hope to alienate member states from the radical Arab countries and leaders whom he saw a looming danger for his power. Therefore, any gesture of goodwill between Shah's friends and suspected enemies takes up the Iranian government very seriously. This can be assessed when normalcy returned to Pak-Egypt's relationship. "The disquiet began as the Shah saw Khan increasing looking to radical Arab revolutionary regimes such as that in Nasser's pro-Soviet Egypt an anathema to the Shah as inspirational movements worthy of Pakistan's admiration and perhaps, even, as collaborators"(Alex,2015,p56) He did not stop here and send a strong message to Pakistan's president, "It

instructed the Iranian ambassador, General Hassan Pakravan, to go and see Ayub Kahn and asked him, ‘why is it that Pakistan always turns to Iran when it has material needs but holds instead 1 00,000 man rallies for Nasser of Egypt?’(Alex, 2015, p56)

India and the Persian Gulf are important for Pakistan and Iran respectively in their foreign policy objectives. Both Pakistan and Iran frequently used these sensitivities to balance their relationship with each other. If Iran has some objection with Pakistan, it let jump to soothe its relationship with India, to give a message to Pakistan. Similarly, if Pakistan gets annoyed with Iran, it starts to close its relationship with the Gulf States. “The Arab question continued to generate friction between Islamabad and Tehran, soon after the 1967 war, the Pakistani media began to refer to the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf” (Alex, 2015, p56). Such incidences paralyze the RCD to accomplish the basic goals for that it was formed. Turkey officially acknowledged these shortcomings during the Regional Planning council meeting in 1967 and shared their thought “Although we have achieved closer cooperation and a better understanding, we are yet to see the concrete results of our joint efforts” (FCO, 1967). Many other factors contributed to the slow pace of the organization, lack of funds for ambitious projects, administrative difficulties to efficiently run the affairs were some obstacles.

After contemplating these deterrents, the British Foreign Office assumed that “it would be very difficult indeed for RCD to make much concrete progress in the economic field at the time” (FCO, 1967) RCD went through many phases since its formation in 1964 and ultimately landed as ECO in 1991. In its first 12 years, its performance was not much satisfactory, just advancing some industrial projects and treaties, it gained nothing. The main objective of the organization to liberalize the trade in the intra-region remained unsuccessful. In 1976 another futile attempt was made to reactivate the organization by making amendments and declarations in the basic documents. These efforts were instituted in the Izmir treaty and adopted as a new framework to invigorate RCD. “Since the first 12 years of applications were unsatisfactory, the three heads of state (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) held a summit in Izmir on 22 April 1976 made amendments to the declaration of 22 July 1964” (Behcet, 2009, p.657). But these exertions once again failed to get desired goals. It was unable to provide any workable format to increase trade and let even any agreeable mechanism for the utilization of resources within the region.

Again there was a divergence of interests among the member states that creates a hurdle to utilize it in full capacity. Nevertheless, RCD remained on paper until 1978, and then regional political upheavals make it inactive. “However, it remained in operation up to the end of 1978, but then lapsed into dormancy from 1979 to 1984” (Behcet, 2009, p.657). This time Iran was the reason for the deactivation as well as the motivator to revive it again for its reasons. The political disorder in Iran, the ouster of Shah, and the arrival of the Religious regime under Khomeini reshape the RCD. In new regional alignment, Pakistan got closer towards Sunni Saudi Arabia, a regional and political rival of Iran. This leads to the over-sensitive and conscious clergy administration in Iran away from RCD.

However, Iran's internal engagements and war with neighboring Iraq proved the immediate cause for the demise of RCD. “Undoubtedly, the political and economic instability in Iran following the 1979 revolution and the ensuing war with Iraq were major factors in the demise of the regional organization” (Bhatti, 1995) Iran's isolation in the international political arena due to its regime radical and anti-West policies ultimately compelled it to come back in the fold of regional arrangements. The death of Khamenei, the demise of the USSR, and the emergence of Central Asian Republics regenerated the RCD into ECO. “Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey restored the organization, renamed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Behcet, 2009, p.657). To accommodate the new countries in the fold and to revitalize the organization, new changes were introduced to make it more acceptable and viable in the new regional and global perspectives. “Following the amendments in the Treaty of Izmir, ECO was fully launched in early 1991” (Hussain, 1992, p.4) However, after its establishment, RCD remained in the phase of issuing communiqué, organizing conferences, and printing shallow leaflets. There were several reasons overdue the successes of RCD performance, deficiency of proper resources to implement the over-ambitious projects, then there were also difficulties in reconciling the various contradictory interests and claims of the member states. Both on political and economic grounds the idea of RCD was weak. On political grounds, except Pakistan only at the start, the other two found no relevance presently with it. But gradually Pakistan felt too that RCD, in reality, failed to benefit it.

## **Pakistan's unfinished agenda**

The RCD proved futile to deliver Pakistan, intended political and military backing against India. Most of the problems that must be solved, however, remained on paper. From 1958 to 1962 more than 98% of the overseas trade of RCD countries was with other countries of the world rather than among themselves. In terms of economic sectors, all RCD states have parallel economic conditions as well as common problems. All were underdeveloped countries and overwhelmingly dependent on the outdated agriculture sector. But even though they, initiated big goals "The first phase of industrialization, based on the production of consumer goods has entered the next phase of industrialization to produce intermediate and capital goods" (Sartaj, 1965, p.7). For example, till 1967, Pakistan's agriculture sector share in total GDP was 45%. Only Iran has some exceptions, thanks to its oil industry that contributed to its economy. They all were dependent on foreign aid and credit to meet their balance of payment difficulties and industrialization. Pakistan like any other developing country was coping with the same condition. Since its foundation, RCD's countries quickly stress that organizational activities are only restricted to cultural and economic fields. RCD was an important symbol for regional collaboration among members outside the old cold war alliances network. Since its foundation, RCD's countries quickly stress that organizational activities are only restricted to cultural and economic fields. RCD was an important symbol for regional collaboration among members outside the old cold war alliances network. But RCD failed to answer the foreign policy needs of Pakistan and other member states due to many factors that limit its usefulness. In general RCD's states never really break their relationship with CENTO. Turkey and Iran's military and economic strength create the impression in the Middle East countries that RCD is an extension of CENTO's unfulfilled dreams of the Western hegemony in the region.

Arab countries suspect the RCD countries' move and never accepted them as a political entity. The theory that Pakistan can use the Turkish and Iranian support to address its imbalance with rival India also failed the test during the 1965 and 1971 Wars. A joint meeting of Iran and Turkey was arranged in Ankara after 9 days starting in the September 1965 war. The joint statement was interesting, it reads, 'declaring their readiness to participate in a peace force if decided by the UNO. This means any independent intervention on part of RCD partners was categorically rejected. Even the military and material support from these countries was limited to small arms and ammunition



in little quantity and did not play any significant role to culminate the war. The Turkish declared that they are keeping the army only for the Cyprus issue. However, it was a rare occasion when any RCD member country gets assistance during the conflict, and Pakistan has the most military and political gain from the regional cooperation. It has been noticed that the political importance of RCD was compromised due to each member state's unwillingness to support each other. It was partly because every country found powerful friends outside the Middle East, who promised to support them in their cause. The relationship was further complicated by the disputes that erupted time and again, between Pakistan and Iran, and between Turkey and Iran.

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## EXPLOITATION OF PASHTUN'S SOCIO-CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS BY THE BRITISHERS: A CASE STUDY OF JIRGA AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

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### Abstract

*When the Britishers failed to suppress the resistance from Pashtuns and Baloch, they adopted some special measures for dealing with the situation. One of these special measures was the introduction of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). Through FCR, they tried to exploit local people's socio-cultural values for furthering their own interests. This paper seeks to investigate as to how the British twisted Pashtun socio-cultural institutions like Jirga and collective responsibility to suppress the resistance to the colonial rule. The study is based on qualitative data mainly collected from primary sources like archival material and interviews and focus group discussions with Pashtun elders and educated people having deeper understanding of both Pashtun socio-cultural values and the colonial policies like FCR.*

**Key Words:** Pashtun, Socio-cultural, institutions, Britishers, Jirga, collective responsibility

### Introduction

The North-west part of Pakistan has always resisted outside powers exercising political authority over it. From 14<sup>th</sup> century onwards when Pashtuns emerged as a distinct nation, the history of the residents of this area has been a history of rebellions against external powers. The dwellers of this area fought against *Sultans* of Delhi, forces of Timur the Lame, troops of Zaheer ud Din Babar and the army of Akbar the Great. They also resisted the authority of Jahangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb. Similarly, Nadir Shah, while returning back after the sack of Delhi was denied passage through the famous Khyber Pass (Khan, 2015). The Sikh regime under Ranjit Singh also failed in

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bringing peace and stability to the frontier (Baha, 1978). Though the Ranjit Singh administration would collect a small revenue from the Pashtuns from settled districts of the current Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it was primarily with the help of 30,000-40,000 troops stationed in Peshawar (Embree, 1979).

As a result of the two wars fought between Sikhs and the East India Company in the 1840s, Punjab slipped from the hands of Sikhs to the East India Company. The occupation of Punjab by the British extended its authority to River Indus (Stewart, 2007). As the frontier was part of Punjab province at that time, the annexation of the Punjab by the Britishers shifted the responsibility for maintaining peace and order at the frontier from the Sikhs to the Britishers. Under the Britishers, resistance to outside forces continued as earlier and thus the Britishers would frequently send military expeditions to crush the forces of resistance (Khan, 2015). In the words of Olaf Caroe, “But no empire of which we have record had ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan” (Caroe, 1958).

In the beginning, the application of Indian Penal Code (IPC) was extended to the settled districts of the North-west frontier. However, the conviction rate, due to the nature of the local society, was very low as compared to the rest of India (Khan, 2014). As the Pashtuns recognize *Pashtunwali*<sup>3</sup> as legitimate law, they did not consider the English law as fair and would either dodge or overlook it (Mahsud, Zubiari, & Hussain, 2016). In order to deal with this situation, British India introduced several special measures. One of the special measures was the modification of IPC's application by promulgation of Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation<sup>4</sup> of 1872 (PFCR) for the trans-Indus districts (Nichols, 2001). It was an administrative and legal code which placed vast powers in the hands of officials serving on the frontier (Embree, 1979). This new code was a mix of British legal codes and the customs of the Pashtuns (Groh, 2006). Under FCR, the officers serving on the frontier not only enjoyed vast powers but they would also get huge sums of money for buying services and loyalty of local elders (Ali, 2011).

British authorities, while promulgating FCR borrowed from Pashtun socio-cultural values and the new code was shaped in such a manner to give the impression that it was based on Pashtun customs to

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<sup>3</sup> A Code of conduct followed by the Pashtuns for centuries.

<sup>4</sup> Later, it was renamed as Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).

make it appeal to their ideals of justice. They basically twisted Pashtun customs to make convictions in criminal cases easier. The purpose of FCR was to increase conviction rates without due process of law. Thus, what ultimately emerged was a mixture of legal codes and local customs without satisfying any of them (Khan, 2015). FCR was actually formulated in a style to give the impression that the government was not interfering in the matters of local people (Ali & Rehman, 2001). The main feature of FCR was exploitation of Pashtun socio-cultural values by the Britishers. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly discuss the exploitation of some core Pashtun socio-cultural institutions-*Jirga and collective/territorial responsibility*- by the Britishers through FCR.

### ***FCR and the institution of Jirga***

Chapter III of FCR 1901 dealt with the Council of Elders locally known as *Jirga*. This chapter empowered the administration to appoint a council of elders for the resolution of civil and criminal disputes. The Deputy Commissioner was given authority to constitute *Jirgas* and refer criminal cases to it where there was insufficient evidence to convict an accused in law of court and then implement the decisions made on *Jirga* recommendations just like a decision of court of law. The *Jirga* worked like a jury but was not bound by law of evidence. The result of this new system was a significant increase in conviction rate (Khan, 2015).

*Jirga* is basically a socio-cultural institution which has been an integral part of Pashtun society for centuries. Thus, when the British assumed charge of the North-west frontier, it realized *Jirga's* importance and the possibility to exploit it for promoting colonial interests (Baha, 1978). According to James W. Spain, the FCR *Jirga* was very different from the one which existed in Pashtun culture (1963). The observation of FCR Committee of 1899 will further elaborate this aspect. It noted, "The normal or indigenous *Jirga* is a tribal assembly acting unanimously. No doubt we have modified the primitive institution in adopting it to our requirements" (Nichols, 2013, p. 109).

There was also difference in the working of the two types of *Jirga*. In the case of traditional or *Olasi Jirga*, the members of the *Jirga* are to be approved by both parties. The common practice is that both the parties to a dispute are asked to nominate an equal number of elders as jury. However, in some cases a *Jirga* already working on a dispute without resolving it may also nominate another *Jirga* for the case but

members of the new *Jirga* are to be acceptable to both sides. After deliberations, the *Jirga* unanimously passes a verdict. In the case of FCR *Jirga*, it was the Deputy Commissioner who was authorized to refer a case to a *Jirga* and also nominate its members.

Under the FCR, the British officers enjoyed discretion to refer cases to *Jirga* or regular court. Similarly, section 16 of the Regulation of 1887 empowered British officers to withdraw a case from court at any stage before acquittal or conviction of the accused and refer it to a *Jirga* for getting the desired outcome. The Regulation also barred civil courts from taking cognizance of any claim with regard to which the Deputy Commissioner had acted under FCR. The Regulation even authorized the Deputy Commissioner to pass a verdict according to the recommendations of the *Jirga*, to remand the case to the same *Jirga* for further findings, to refer it to a new *Jirga*, or refer it to a civil court (Govt of Punjab, 1887).

The logic for referring cases to the *Jirga* instead of civil courts is understandable-getting easy convictions. For example, a letter written by chief secretary to the Government of Punjab to British officials in Peshawar in 1994 observed, "In several cases of convictions which the Lieutenant-Governor has had before him since he came to Punjab there was no definite finding by the *Jirga* of any facts constituting an offence," (Nichols, 2013, p. 87).

Another letter written by Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab and its Dependencies H. C. Fanshawe to the Commissioner and Superintendent *Derajat* Divisions in 1896 noted, "In one case which came up on revision, the Magistrate had appointed the whole of the witnesses for the prosecution as *Jirga*, who, needless to add, convicted the accused." He added, "On recently holding temporary charge of the Peshawar Division, I found Magistrates appointing time after time the same men to serve on *Jirgas*" (Fanshawe, 1896).

This clearly shows that the *Jirga* practiced by the colonial power under FCR was much different from the indigenous *Jirga* which acted according to some well-established unwritten norms. The British India actually exploited an old Pashtun cultural institution to safeguard its own interests. The FCR *Jirga* neither satisfied the requirements of modern justice system nor of traditional justice system.

*FCR Jirgas* have also come under criticism from higher courts of Pakistan. For example, while considering the point whether the

mechanism provided by FCR for deciding cases be considered as a law, Supreme Court judge Justice A. R. Cornelius observed,

In the case of *Jirgas*, no procedure of any kind is laid down. The [only requirements] are that there should be such inquiry 'as may be necessary' and the accused person should be heard [...] [I]t seems clear enough that the purpose of the Regulation also is that none of the recognized rules of evidence should be binding upon the *Jirga*. The process of decision provided under the Regulation is also foreign to justice as administered by the Courts. The hearing is before a *Jirga* but the power of decision is vested in the Deputy Commissioner, who does not hear the accused or any of the witnesses, and is not empowered by the law to do so, even if he should desire. In these circumstances, the *Jirga* is merely an advisory body, and since the Deputy Commissioner does not have the case presented before him through counsel, it is obvious that the decision is wholly vicarious. (NCHR, 2016, 26).

He further added that "*Jirgas* sometimes declare that they have held 'open and secret inquiries', which suggests investigations of a nature entirely different from those which are permissible in a Court of Law" (Shinwari, 46). The hearing is before a *Jirga* but the power of decision is vested in the Deputy who does not see or hear the accused or any of the witnesses, and is not empowered by law to do so, even if he should so desire (Shinwari, 2011, 47).

As the *FCR Jirga* is a distorted form of the traditional or *Olas* *Jirga*, there is also much difference in levels of their popularity among the people. For example, the findings of a survey conducted by CAMP in 2011 revealed a huge difference in levels of their credibility. Responding to a question as "In your opinion, what type of *Jirga* is most trusted for resolving disputes in this area?," 70.47% (1057 out of 1500) mentioned *Olas* *Jirga*, 12.07% (181 out of 1500) respondents cited *FCR Jirga* while 0.67% (10 out of 1500) opted for *Taliban Jirga* (Shinwari, 2011). These statistics clearly show that it is the traditional *Jirga* which enjoys people's support.

There are also other studies that cast doubts on fairness and impartiality of *FCR Jirga*.

## Collective/Territorial Responsibility and FCR

Collective and territorial responsibility under FCR was the most important tool in the hands of British authorities for establishing colonial writ in the Pashtun lands. The concept of *collective responsibility* was first introduced by *Colonel Coke* immediately after Punjab was annexed by the Britishers. The procedure devised by Cook in case of any trouble was:

To close the pass at once, seize all *Afridis* to be found in [the] Peshawar and Kohat districts, sell their cattle, stop all allowances and, when the matter is settled, cause all losses to be made good, not from the confiscated allowances but from the allowances made from the time they may commence. (Afridi, 2012: para 6).

Herbert Edwards, who assumed charge as Commissioner Peshawar in 1853, further advanced the system of collective punishment when he ordered the arrest of every *Kuki Khel Afridi* after some members of the subtribe intercepted a British messenger going to *Kabul* from *India* (Afridi, 2012; Embree, 1979). This method of *collective responsibility* was given formal shape with the introduction of *FCR*. For example, Chapter IV of *FCR* 1901 dealt with collective and territorial responsibility. Section 21 of *FCR* 1901 stated;

In the event of any frontier tribe or of any section or members of such a tribe, acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner towards the British Govt. or towards persons residing within British India, the Deputy Commissioner may with the previous sanction of the Commissioner by order in writing direct

(a) The seizure, wherever they may be found, of all or any of the members of such Tribe and of all or any property belonging to them or any of them:

(b) the detention in safe custody of any person or property so seized and:

(c) The confiscation of any such property: and many with the like sanction by Public proclamation:

(d) Debar all or any member of the tribe from all access into British India: and

(e) Prohibit all or any persons within the limits of British India from all intercourse or communication of any kind whatsoever or of any specified kind or kinds



with such tribe or any section or members thereof.  
(Govt. of Punjab, 1901, section 21).

Similarly, section 22 authorized the Deputy Commissioner to impose fine on the residents of a village or part thereof if he thought that they abetted the commission of a crime on their soil, failed to render all support for the arrest of the culprits, facilitated the criminals escape or harbored them. Section 23 was also closely related to section 22. It added that in case a person was seriously or fatally wounded in the premises of a village or a part of it, the crime would be considered to be committed by the community of that village unless the village headmen showed that they; (a)"had not an opportunity of preventing the offence or arresting the offender (b) have used all reasonable means to bring the offender to justice." (Govt. of Punjab, 1901, section 22 &23).

The above mentioned sections point toward two types of responsibilities: collective and territorial. *Collective responsibility* was the mechanism through which the British authorities would punish a whole tribe or subtribe for the acts of one individual or few persons. The action included arrest of anyone found anywhere, seizure of properties, animals, and closure of businesses of persons belonging to the tribe from which someone would commit crime. Under the territorial responsibility section, the administration would hold a complete tribe, subtribe or village responsible for any crime taking place on their soil. These two types of punishments were based, as claimed by the Britishers, on two socio-cultural practices in Pashtun society. The first is the concept of *Baramata* and the second is the practice of collective defense of common or joint land. In the following paragraphs, we will briefly explain them and will also show how they deviated from established practices in *Pashtun* society.

### **Collective punishment/responsibility**

According to the Britishers, the idea of collective punishment (punishing the whole tribe for the acts of individuals) was derived from the concept of *Baramata* in *Pashtun* culture. Olaf Caroe, who first joined Indian civil service and later served as Government of India's foreign secretary and governor of the then North-west frontier province, justified the practice by stating,

It follows from this principle that an aggrieved party can enforce his remedy against any tribesmen on whom he can lay hands. That is the essence of tribal

responsibility, a system which admits the justice of *Baramata* as an effective weapon for securing rights and claims. (Aziz, 2013).

*Baramata* was a practice in Pashtun society under which an aggrieved party would take in custody some goods, animals or even persons of another family, tribe, and subtribe etc. to compel it to make good the losses inflicted upon it or return debts etc. Suppose some people from one tribe kidnapped a few people belonging to another tribe. Now the aggrieved tribe would take in custody an equal number of people from the culprits' tribe to compel it to pressurize the culprits for the release of the captives. Similarly, people would take in custody animals to secure the release of their animals held by another tribe or family etc. People would also use *Baramata* for compelling others to return loans.

No doubt, the British administration at the frontier used the concept of *Baramata* as the foundation for collective punishment but it actually practiced its distorted form.

According to Abdul Qayum, a researcher from Hangu, the concept of *Baramata* provided base to the concept of collective punishment but there was much difference between the operationalization of the two. Unlike in Pashtun society where the aggrieved party would take in custody an equal number of people or goods from the aggressors, the Britishers would start arresting complete tribes and their properties for the crime of a single individual (personal communication, February 28, 2021). Analyzing the difference between the two, an elder from Orakzai district Ajmal Khan said that in *Baramata*, the aggrieved party taking in custody men or goods was to do so in proportion to the losses done to it. In the case of British system, there used to be disproportionate use of coercive power against complete tribes. Thus, British administration would arrest dozens or even hundreds of people to secure the arrest of one accused (personal communication, February 20, 2021).

Another difference in *Baramata* and collective punishment was about treatment of those taken in custody. In case of the former, the one in custody would get proper respect, food, and dress while those arrested under *FCR* would be treated like prisoners who would even face punishments while in custody (Qayum, 2021). According to Muhammad Saeed, a researcher from Bajaur who has deep understanding of both *FCR* and Pashtun socio-cultural values, those

arrested under *FCR's collective responsibility* section would be treated like prisoners while the ones taken in custody under *Baramata* would get better food than his captors (personal communication, March 1, 2021).

Under *Baramata*, the aggrieved party would take in custody persons or goods corresponding to the acts of the aggressor. In the case of *FCR*, the state would not only arrest dozens of people but would also close down all shops and other businesses belonging to the members of tribe, subtribe, or clan against which it would take action under *collective responsibility* section. Thus, the Britishers would severely harm the economy of the whole tribe or subtribe. This practice of sealing of businesses of the whole tribe even in the settled areas continued till recently. For example, the political administration of FR Kohat while acting under *collective responsibility* section of *FCR* in 2005 sealed, among other businesses, a multi-storey market (Gul Haji Plaza) in Peshawar with some four hundred shops (Computer market, 2005). Therefore, a state's disproportionate use of coercive force cannot be justified on the basis of socio-cultural values with far limited implications.

Furthermore, in *Baramata*, the aggrieved party could not bar the aggressors from entering markets etc. located at neutral places. The maximum it could do was to bar them from their own (aggrieved party's) village/territory only. In the case of *FCR*, the scope of blockade was very broad. The government would enforce a blockade against the whole tribe or subtribe in all areas under the writ of the state. It was also stated in the *FCR* that all people within the limits of British India may be prohibited from any kind of interaction or communication with the members of the tribe or subtribe against whom the section had been invoked. The basic purpose of this policy was to create a shortage of food and other necessary items in the areas facing blockade. This was a very harsh and inhumane policy as it also affected women, children, and elderly people (personal communication with a retired bureaucrat who did not want to be quoted by name). In recent years, there were even cases in which government refused to issue identity documents like identity cards and passports to people belonging to a tribe or subtribe facing punishment under collective responsibility. For example, a civil servant<sup>5</sup> who was once posted in the erstwhile FATA also acknowledged that they would stop processing applications for identity cards and domiciles of people belonging to the tribe facing punishment under *collective responsibility* section.

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<sup>5</sup> He did not want to be named in the research article.

The second component of *collective responsibility* under FCR was territorial responsibility. It meant making residents of a village etc. responsible for a crime taking place on their soil irrespective of who committed the crime. According to Saeed, as land used to be commonly owned, people were collectively responsible for any crime taking place on it. British asked the Pashtuns to ensure that their soil will not be used for attacks against British officers and installations etc. People were unwilling to give such a guarantee. Ultimately, British agreed to pay people in each tribe, clan etc. in return for watch and ward duty. Thus, it would award a fixed number of Khasadar jobs to each subtribe or Khel in return for their pledge that they would protect colonial interests in their respective areas (Saeed, 2021).

Apparently, it was a good system as British had to pay the people for maintaining peace and security in the area. However, in reality it was not that simple. During discussions with several people, it was discovered that the British would take notice of crimes committed either against government officials, installations etc. or taking place in protected areas like roads and premises of government offices. Thus, British's concern was not safety of the people rather safeguarding its own interests. In case a murder would take place on government roads, the administration would impose fine on the killer or his tribe in case the killer was known. In case the killer was unknown, the government would impose fine on the tribe or *khel* on whose soil the murder took place. It would do so not to punish the killer for his crime but to punish him for committing the crime on government land and thus violating the sanctity of government land. Thus, roads' sanctity was more important for the administration than human life and the system was for the protection of state's interests rather than the well-being of the people. The system continued until recently when FCR was withdrawn in 2018.

## **Conclusion**

Though it is said that the idea of collective punishment was derived from local customs, the reality is that the Britishers exploited and twisted Pashtun socio-cultural values and institutions for their own interests. No doubt, the concept of collective and territorial responsibility existed before the introduction of FCR but it was significantly different from the one incorporated in and implemented through FCR. Even under the Close Border Policy, the British officers would prohibit Pashtuns in the tribal areas from entering areas under British administration. The British administrators would even deny the

people living in the mountainous areas access to British markets and even to their own lands in the plain areas. Now the question arises whether this segregation of people with common cultural, economic, and family ties was also based on Pashtun values? The answer is definitely negative. There are many people, especially foreigners and non-Pashtun Pakistanis who have tried to prove that FCR was actually based on Pashtun's socio-cultural values. For example, Ty L. Groh observes, "*Pashtuns* accept the *FCR* because it exists under the auspices of *Pashtunwali*." However, the truth is that the Britishers while formulating *FCR* twisted Pashtun socio-cultural norms to give the impression that the system was based on their values which in reality was neither judicial in nature nor traditional.

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## PAKISTANI MIGRANT LABOURERS AND SOCIAL NETWORK: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA

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### Abstract

*This study attempts to address the remarkable role of social networks in developing pre-migration expectations of Pakistani migrant labourers towards Malaysia. The literature places focus on the role of social network vaguely without relying on the network theory, along with other broad concepts of social network. However, this study examined the influences of social network on migrant labourers while developing their pre-migration expectations by relying on four propositions of network theory of migration and with a detailed qualitative analysis of a labourer group from Pakistan to Malaysia. Different viewpoints were collected through interviews with 21 Pakistani migrant labourers from various areas of Malaysia. A range of thematic and dynamic questions were designed, the snowball sampling technique was applied, and the information was gathered until it hits the saturation point. Results indicated that both formal and informal network act an influential actor in initiating migration with a development of pre migration expectation. Social network such as migrant institutions also plays an important role in structuring migration decisions of Pakistani migrant labours in Malaysia. Hence, this study adds to the knowledge of social networks of Pakistani labourers in Malaysia and contributes theoretically to the migration data, which is a concern to everyone, both individuals and public administrators. This study may guide other researchers to formulate and understand some missing links.*

**Key Words:** Migrant labour, Social network, Network Theory, Malaysia, Pakistan

### Introduction

Most of the migrant labours in Malaysia have tended to be semi-skilled and low-skilled and are doing work in labour-concentrated sectors namely manufacturing, agriculture, plantation, construction, and domestic, and living in the Selangor, Johor, and Kuala Lumpur. Data

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from MOHR show that more than half percent of the documented migrant labours live in the three states of Malaysia such as 30% are in Selangor, 18% are in Johor and 15% are in Kuala Lumpur (See Figure 1.2). These migrant labours have tended to work on elementary occupations or a machine operating job (Figure 1.3) as well as those are focused on the domestic (7 percent) agriculture (9 percent), services (14 percent), plantation (15 percent), construction (19 percent), manufacturing (36 percent) sectors and sub-sectors.

Figure 1.2: Main destinations of migrant labours in Malaysia, 2018






Figure 1.3: Sectoral distribution of migrant labours in Malaysia, 2018



Source: MOHR, 2018

Meanwhile, in the list of South Asian countries, Pakistan is populous nation with an increasing trend of migration of labour force to other host countries across the globe. In fact, Pakistan is among the top ten countries with the largest number of people migrating to other countries (United Nation, 2017). Since the past four years, more than 6 million Pakistani people have migrated abroad through a formal network for employment, wherein migration from Pakistan has been a new topmost after 2011 (Xing, Dumont, & Baruh, 2014). Statistics derived from the ((BEOE), 2020) revealed that the total number of Pakistani labours in other countries were 209,637 in 2008, to over 523,917 in 2015 then plummeted to less than 400,000 in 2019 (figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4: Total Number of Pakistani Labours In Other Countries



Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), 2020

In the past, the most populous destinations among migrants were Iran, Oman, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, but Malaysia has emerged as a new potential destination since the past four years (Tasleem, Ajis, & Abidin, 2019a, 2019b; Tasleem, Ajis, & Abidin, 2020). The DOSM (2019) described Pakistan as the sixth-largest country of origin for almost 3.11% of migrant workers employed in Malaysia. Their ratio tends to escalate day-by-day; increment from 58,957 in 2017 to 63,358 in January 2019. Most of them dwell in Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Kedah, and Johor. They are mostly involved in the construction, plantation, and services sector (High commission of Pakistan Kuala Lumpur, 2019). Table 1.1 shows the ratios of Pakistani migrant labours per year employed in various sectors of Malaysia.

**Table 1.1 Number of Pakistani documented Migrant labours in Malaysia by sector**

	Manufacturing	Construction	Plantation	Services	Agriculture	Domestic	Total
2015	3,606	31,988	8,032	6,486	22,784	35	72,931
2016	4,005	26,734	6,155	6,274	19,545	32	62,745
2017	3,893	24,761	5,897	6,340	18,027	39	58,957
2018	3,558	24,328	5,769	6,229	17,842	39	57,665
2019	3,328	27,885	5,918	9,191	17,006	30	63,358

Figure 1.1 Pakistani Migrant labours per year in various sectors of Malaysia

Source: High commission of Pakistan, Kuala Lumpur (2019)

Consequently, Malaysia and Pakistan are prominent countries within the context of labour migration. Investigating these two countries in the domain of international migration offers evidence-based knowledge pertaining to a noteworthy role of social network in a decision to migrate in the host country. Basically, social network has been emergent exponentially across a range of fields and disciplines (Conway, 2014). Unfortunately, social network has not been extensively investigated in the migration domain (Ryan, 2011). Several years back, scholars have begun assessing social networks in a systematic manner (Bilecen & Sienkiewicz, 2015).

The literature places focus on the role of social network vaguely without relying on the migration theory, along with other broad concepts of social network (Ryan & D'Angelo, 2018). Most studies have focused on the role of social networking to develop networks in business (Ryan & Mulholland, 2014a, 2014b; Sommer & Gamper, 2018), contribution in economies (Mazzucato, 2006; Wang, Zhang, & Ni, 2015) and in labour market integration (Ho & Turk-Ariss, 2018; Martín-Montaner, Serrano-Domingo, & Requena-Silvente, 2018). However, studies on the role of social networks on migrant decision to migrate and in developing pre migration expectation by relying on four propositions of network theory of migration specially in the context of Malaysia are in scarcity.

Thus, this study relies on four propositions of network theory of migration according to which one is more likely to migrate if: 1) he/she has somebody living abroad; that likelihood increases with closeness of relationship (e.g.- if person living abroad is a brother, sister or mother); 2) if he/she has already migrated before; 3) if migration is common in his community of origin and values related to migration become part of community values and; 4) there are migrant institutions (e.g., recruitment agencies, government agencies) that act as a structural component to migrant networks, suggesting that interpersonal ties are not only triggers of migration and more fully examining the role of formal (namely-recruitment agencies) and informal networks (namely- family and friends) in the decision to migration.

### **Network Theory of Migration**

If in this study, researchers included network theory that focusing on the migrant labours than researchers may determine that social networks play a significant part on the satisfaction level of the migrant labours towards migration. Also, the network theory is

constructed on theory of social capital (Massey1993). Therefore, the existence of this sort of social capital expands the expectation to have a settle life in the country where they are migrated. Massey et al. (1993) discussed the network theory of migration and ground it in the idea of social capital. The social capital concept has first been established by Glenn Loury to delineate a set of imperceptible assets in communities and families that support to foster social development amongst youngsters. Still, it was Bourdieu to first directly articulate its broader significance to human society (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

The main feature of social capital is its convertibility as it can be changed into new types of capital. Individuals get social capital through social institutions and association in networks and then translate it into material resources to advance or keep their status in society. Applying this concept to migration, sociologists realized the significance of migrant networks in stimulating international migration to a host country. Migrant networks are “collections of social ties that link migrants, non-migrants and former migrants, in destination and origin regions through ties of friendship, kinship and common communal origin” (Massey et al. 1993, p.448). Relying on social ties to friends and relatives who have migrated before, non-migrants get access to support, knowledge and other means that ease migration (Bell & Bivand Erdal, 2015)

Network theory also argues that organisations act as a basic component to networks of migrant, suggesting that social ties are not only triggers of migration (Lin, 2017). Over time, migrants get to know about for-profit firms and organizations which offer a variety of facilities to migrants in conversation for fees, representing another type of social capital on which they can rely in getting access to a foreign labour market. The services offered by private entrepreneurs and for-profit organizations often include: clandestine transport to internal destinations; visas and counterfeit documents; arranged marriages among those who legally reside and migrants or are citizens in receiving countries; and providing accommodation, credit or other forms of support in home countries (Merli, Verdery, Mouw, & Li, 2016).

In light of the qualitative research approach adopted for this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 Pakistani migrant labours from various areas, mostly from Klang Valley, Malaysia. Selection of this area is because Klang Valley is the industrial and commercial hub in Malaysia and majority of migrant

labours are working here (Tey, 2017). A range of thematic and dynamic questions were designed, and the snowball sampling technique was employed to select informants via referral. Researchers got in touch with her friend whose father was working in a restaurant that employed Pakistani employees. He further referred the details of other Pakistani migrant labours (participants) working in Malaysia. They were approached by the researchers in shopping malls, restaurants, carpet shops, manufacturing companies, and construction areas; hence amounting to 21 interview sessions with Pakistani migrant labours between May 2018 and April 2019. The number of informants was determined when the information gathered hit the saturation point. It was not predetermined by the researchers. During the interview, informants were fully allowed to give details about their experiences and expand on different features they supposed to be related. Their responses uncovered the basic of research on labour experiences regarding social network during migration. For data analysis, the thematic analysis was performed.

### **Finding and Discussion**

Social networks play a key role in the pre-migration expectations of Pakistani migrant workers in Malaysia. Whether a potential migrant thinks about migration due to their bad financial situation or just out of curiosity or desire for exploration, social networks to which he/she is connected prove to be of crucial importance in whether such a plan will become reality. In addition, there are some other ways in which social networks affect such pre-migration. In particular, all the four propositions of social network migration theory that the researchers explored in relation to the research goal of examining the role of social networks (both formal and informal) in migration decision and pre-migration expectations of Pakistani migrant labours in Malaysia have been based on the experiences shared by the informants.

### **Strong and Weak Ties**

The interviews with participants lend support for the role of personal networks of family and friends who are already dwelling in Malaysia in structuring the pre-migration expectations of Pakistani migrant workers, in which the researcher had examined based on the first proposition of the network theory. As mentioned above, this proposition posits that the likelihood that someone will migrate is greater if he/she has somebody living abroad; that likelihood increases with the closeness of the relationship (if a person living abroad is

brother, sister or mother) (Arango, 2017; Massey et al., 1993). Thus, this theory of migration implies that both weak and strong ties play a role in one's decision to migrate. Based on this theory, the greater the strength of the relationship of potential migrants with the person living abroad, the greater possibility that he/she will decide to migrate and expect positive life outcomes in Malaysia.

Interviews with the Pakistani migrant workers revealed that most of them did have someone (relatives or friends or together to whom they have been firmly attached) who had been/ remained previously in Malaysia while they were thought about migration. In numerous cases, referred to above were very immediate family members (namely- fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters) and incredibly close by acquaintances from their native countries (people from their native towns/villages whom they knew since childhood). For certain, these have been individuals they encountered while doing job as domestic co-workers in other nations but became very good friends in short duration. The importance of being strongly connected to somebody who is already in Malaysia is illustrated by the following excerpts from the interviews:

*“My friend. Very close friend. He lived in the same city as me. He told me Malaysia is a good country so I think, yeah, I should come here. He had influenced me to take a decision to come and expect positive about life after migration. Actually, before that, I hesitated to come here. It's the same country. I have no friends here. Maybe I feel lonely. But after coming here, I say that's good” (P 10).*

One informant was contacted by a relative with direct job offer, while some had close or distant relatives and friends in Malaysia. The informants stated that these networks did not have any impact on their decision to move and expect about life in this country.

In some cases, those who have already migrated to Malaysia and had an impact on the pre-migration expectations of Pakistani migrant workers, which involved in the decision to migrate, were not close to the participants. This is in accordance with the above proposition of network theory that indicates that even weaker ties to people abroad can impact one's decision to migrate and influence him to create expectations about the host country. This was well-explained by an informant:

*“I was influenced by my friends who migrated to Malaysia before me. Because when they talk about it, they say it is a good place to work and when I see them back home, they have a good life, so it influences me to come here. These are not really close but some of my friends used to work in the same place that I worked with, so we had some communications, but they are not really like my best friends” (P 7).*

Additionally, many informants responded that they had pre-migration information from family and friends that led to positive expectations about living a better life in Malaysia. Informants also viewed that already migrated friends, agents, and family members gave pre-migration information that helped them in formulating expectations about settlement.

Many informants responded that they had pre-migration information from family and friends, thus the positive expectations about a better life in Malaysia. Fanjoy et al. (2005) noted that pre-migration information is an influential feature in forming the expectations of migrants about settlement. In this study, the informants responded that they had family members and friends in Malaysia which told them about their successful life in Malaysia after migration. This inspired them and they made their positive expectations about Malaysia.

*“My friend told me about the peaceful environment of Malaysia.....the safety, security..... I was impressed and decided to migrate to Malaysia” (P 2).*

*“My friend was here two years before me. He told me about the peaceful life in Malaysia. He told me that there were many employment opportunities. He said he will help me in settling my life in Malaysia. We will enjoy over life here..... his words made my positive expectation about the migration” (P 6).*

*“Agent.... Who arranged my visa for Malaysia....? gave me pre-migration information about Malaysia” (P 15).*

The responses suggested that expectations of most informants were based on discussion with friends and relatives. They suggested and gave information about migration and mostly arranged jobs, as explained by P21. The informants responded that already settled relatives gave them information about the peaceful life in Malaysia.

They also gave information about the exchange rate that is higher than Pakistan's Rupee. Hence, the following responses from informants described the pre-migration information that underpinned their expectations.

*“I mostly discussed my economic situation and dream of a better life with my cousin who was living in Malaysia. One day, I was very depressed with my situation.... I told him... he suggested and give information about migration to Malaysia” (P 11).*

*“My cousin was lived in Malaysia. He had a restaurant at that time. He arranged my job in his restaurant. And told me about the peaceful life in Malaysia. He told me that the exchange rate is high as compare to Pakistan. If I do hard work here I can easily afford my family. This influences me to expect positive about life after migration to Malaysia” (P 18).*

*“One of my friends who were working with me in the construction sector informed me about the job opportunities in Malaysia” (P 13).*

*“My friend suggested to me that the exchange rate of Malaysia is high as compare to Pakistan. I can return my father's debt easily if I work in Malaysia” (P 1).*

These findings affirmed the results reported by Rowe (2007), Mähönen et al. (2013), (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010), and Fanjoy et al. (2005) about the significance of the information that influences the expectations of migrants before migrating to host country. The informants were expected to collect their own pre-migration information from their families and friends. It is, therefore, found that a majority of the informants had expectations for a better life overall in the perspective of better economic opportunities, security, better environment, and happiness as the most important drivers to make the decision for migration. Information from family and friends is the best indicator for them to formulate their expectations and decide on migration.

Poor exchange of information was a hurdle for informants in developing truthful expectations. Poor information created improbable expectations linked to the situation of ‘shock’. The interrelated point is that when it was questioned from the informants that why and how they



had designed their expectations that had directed to a situation of shock, as these informants did not seek pre-migration information from friends and family who had already settled in Malaysia.

When the issue was further investigated, the informants could not reply as to why they had not endeavoured to gather information from their friends and families living in Malaysia, other than to reply that they did not want to disturb or burden their friends and families. A few informants who collected information from the friends and families recalled that information was 'light', just making my mind that Malaysia is a good place to migrate. In some cases, friends and families who were already living in Malaysia stressed the significance of employment and hard work, without a good job it is not possible to survive happily.

*“One person from my neighbour was already living in Malaysia.... however, I did not attempt to gather any information about life after migration. I had in my mind that it will be easy, don't disturb anyone to get information” (P 21).*

*“I do not want to burden my friend and questioned more about life in Malaysia” (P 9).*

*“When my agent told me about the job, I did not ask him about the accommodation and other expenses” (P 15).*

*“I had to get all information about my job, house, agent home, job..... the information I had was not sufficient that's why I faced trouble in reaching my place” (P 17).*

This study revealed that the poor exchange of information was based on understanding among the individuals who gathered information and those providing the information. In one case, the informant recalled that some friends and families who were already in Malaysia would not want to display the real struggling picture of their life after migration. They had their point of view that this struggling picture would get the wrong idea about migration. Those who had wanted to migrate clarified that they did not wish to disturb, and it was bad-manners to pump their friends and families for information. The informants also replied they had an idea that they had gathered sufficient information from the conversations and stories of already migrated people. However, poor exchange of information was a hurdle in developing truthful expectations.

*“My friend told me about job opportunities, but he did not tell me the real struggling picture” (P 10).*

*“Really, I believed that it’s a bad manner to disturb your friend and gather information about life in Malaysia” (P 12).*

The real picture of life was noted by informants after making their own experience in the host country. As one informant recalled, he had expected an easy life in Malaysia. His belief was similar with other migrants in Malaysia. However, he realised that life is tough as he had started his job in Malaysia. He commented that Pakistanis in Malaysia were hiding their struggling life from me. The response of that migrant is quoted below:

*“I first thought that life in Malaysia will be easy.... I reach Malaysia and meet with many Pakistani. You know, even I believe that life will be easy. Pakistani in Malaysia hide their struggling life from me.....hmmm... when I experienced my job, I found that real life is tough here. I have to work hard...” (P 19).*

Similarly, Fanjoy et al. (2005), Thompson (2016), and Jadhav (2018) found that poor information led to improbable expectations that are linked to the situation of ‘shock’. Thompson (2016) revealed that the settlement of migrants in New Zealand was due to poor information provided by friends and family about their expectations for the settlement in the host country, which is a similar case in this present study. As such, this study recommends that the shock and negative initial settlement experienced by informants can be reduced if the informants had been able to get accurate information prior to migration. The delivery of accurate information would have been predominantly supportive of those informants, who were pointedly deprived.

Regardless of the strength of such relationships, having somebody abroad appears to be of great importance in pre-migration expectations and the decision to migrate by Pakistani migrant workers. As the vast majority of these individuals in foreign countries were former in addition present Pakistani migrant workers, forthcoming Pakistani migrant workers would want to listen to their experiences with this immigration program and see for themselves whether and how much their lives could improve upon migration. Only a few participants did not have anybody already living in Malaysia or some other places

abroad and were the first to migrate into this country. Some informants explained that they were the first in the migration chain – they were first to come and subsequently they brought their family members and friends. Given that they did not know anybody enrolled in a program, they learned from recruitment agencies that advertised their services either in their country of origin or another transitional country in which they worked prior to migrating to Malaysia.

### **Previous Migration Experience**

The second proposition of network theory is that one is more likely to decide to migrate if he/she has already migrated before (Curran & Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Massey & Espinosa, 1997; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Most of the participants have worked in different countries before they had decided to come to Malaysia. They reported working in one or more of the following places: Dubai, Oman, Bahrain, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia. One Pakistani reported having worked in five countries before migrating to Malaysia. Most of the Pakistani migrant workers interviewed had worked as domestic helpers before this. By focusing on the previous migration experiences in the migration decision of a prospective migrant, the second proposition of network theory emphasises that people who have already migrated draw on social ties created in their past migration endeavours (Massey & Espinosa, 1997).

And indeed, as already mentioned above, after working abroad in these various countries as domestic helpers, many of the participants met some people (mostly coming from their countries of origin) who soon became their friends and proved to be of crucial importance in encouraging them to migrate to Malaysia. Thus, Pakistani migrant labourers' decision to come to Malaysia was not only rooted in ties that they had people already in Malaysia, but also ties that they had established elsewhere, working abroad as a migrant. While some past researches demonstrated the role of previous migration experience from the same country in structuring one's decision to move again to the same country (Atanackovic & Bourgeault, 2014), this study revealed migration experiences from other countries as significant as well in structuring one's pre-migration expectations and the decision to move to a different destination. This is an important revelation, especially in the light of today's migration patterns, wherein a great number of labour migrants have experienced working in multiple locations around the world.

## Community Values towards Migration

The experiences of participants reflected the role of attitudes within the home country of potential migrants in structuring pre-migration expectations and migration decisions of Pakistani migrant workers. As already mentioned, this third postulate of network theory asserts that somebody is more likely to migrate if migration is common in his place of origin where “migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people’s behaviours and values associated with migration become part of community’s values” (Massey et al., 1993, p.452- 453). And indeed, all the participants came from Pakistan where migration is very common, and the culture of migration is greatly developed. The participants explained that people from Pakistan tend to migrate to other countries and settle temporarily or permanently there as given the bad financial situation and lack of job opportunities in Pakistan. For example, asked whether it is common for people from their country to leave, two participants explained:

*“Yes, it’s very common because of the problem in my country. it’s not easy to find a job and the salaries are low. So, if you have the chance to go abroad you can do it. They just do it and not many of them come back to Pakistan, just the people who suffer in another country and they say okay” (P 8).*

*“Yes, it is. It is very, very common. Like it’s like a thousand lined up for an interview. It’s different country around the world. I could say maybe it’s because we are overly populated so the opportunities for a better future are very slim and the graduates, in one course the graduates are like hundreds of thousands a year. To put the young graduates into employment that’s the problem. So, unemployment is the number one problem there too. Like an economic, you know, collapse” (P 21).*

The interviewees revealed that attitude towards migrating to work abroad in their home country as very positive as they are mostly seen as courageous people. Some stated that although they endured many hardships working as labourers, often this is neglected by people from their home countries who tend to look up to them and see them as rich and happy people.

In line with the finding of this study, Castles and Miller (2017) mentioned Pakistan as a source country for international migration

mainly in the Asian Pacific region. They found that Pakistan is the second-largest country for the import of labour in Asia. Pakistan is a populous nation with an increasing trend of international migration of the labour force, as depicted in a report from the United Nations (2017), which stated that Pakistan is among the top ten countries with six million people had migrated to other countries.

### **Migration Institutions**

Recruitment organizations are a vital source of information about migration and settlement for potential Pakistani migrant workers that do not know anyone previously residing in Malaysia or else doing job in compliance with this immigration system. Recruitment organizations provide as an alternative source of information regarding the plan as well as for some Pakistani migrant employees who have first found out about the plan from personal contacts. Explaining how he initially learned about the immigration from friends but wanted to be sure that such information is accurate, one participant recalled:

*“Oh yeah, there are friends who are telling me about migration to Malaysia. For me, I am the kind of person I want everything is clear, you know. So, I went to the agency. Other Pakistani is just asking, co-Pakistani, you know, so I don’t want to rely on that. I want to go in person and ask them what kind of job we are going to work in Malaysia and stuff like that, you know” (P 13).*

The role of agencies in shaping migration decisions is especially significant in the case of participants due to the high rate of labour institutionalisation in Asia. Still, recruitment agencies are a valuable source of information on migration not only for Pakistanis, but also for people from other countries. Given that the findings of this study revealed that recruitment agencies have an impact on pre-migration expectations and migration decisions of prospective Pakistani migrant workers, they reflected the role of migrant institutions in structuring their migration decision.

As already explained above, the fourth postulate highlights that informal networks are not only triggered by migration and those migrant institutions (defined as institutions that try to control the migration process for their own gain such as recruitment agencies) do play a great role in such a process as well (Cranston et al., 2018). Kern and Müller-Böker (2015) revealed that migrants have a good opinion

towards recruitment agencies. Besides some fraud cases and bad practices, recruiters play a significant role in assisting international migration and representing the essential infrastructure for the labour movement. Recruitment agencies are those who connect places and people, establish social networks, and can perform a vital part in making immigration secure and safe. They are valuable mediators in assisting alternative income approaches, as well as new living and employment opportunities. Similarly, these agencies are entrepreneurs in a risky and competitive economic area, threatened with multidimensional limitations.

Recruitment agencies for Pakistanis control the flow of information about migration to potential migrants, thus acting as another form of social capital on which they can draw in making their expectation decision. They complement their structural and individual motivations for migration, making their move more possible. Hence, the four propositions of the network theory of migration are reflected in the experiences of the participants in this study.

As has been seen, recruitment agencies for Pakistani control the flow of information about migration to potential migrant, thus acting as another form of social capital on which they can draw in making their expectation decision. In this way, they complement their structural and individual motivations for migration, making their move more possible. All four propositions of network theory of migration prove to be reflected in the experiences of respondents.

## **Conclusion**

In sum, this chapter sheds light on the role of social networks in developing pre-migration expectations and made the decision to migrate. Social networks (formal and informal) are important in developing pre-migration expectations, so as to aid in making migration decision based on information gathered about the possibility of undertaking employment in Malaysia. Social networks (informal and formal) in Malaysia, in transitional countries in which they temporarily worked prior to Malaysia, and in their home countries, all prove to be integral factors in developing pre-migration expectations that led to migration decision. This study revealed that recruitment agencies had a more significant role in the process of decision making among participants. This is because; in Asia, labour migration is highly institutionalised and supported by governments of many countries. Additionally, this study proved that social network theory of migration has a great contribution while examining the key role of social

networks in the developing pre migration expectations. Thus, it is concluded that researchers should make a conjunction of social network theory to better analyze the migrants and their migration. By doing such new empirical understandings, this study contributes to the literature on labour migration in the international context.

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## COMPARISON OF BALOCH AND PASHTUN CULTURE AS DEPICTED IN NAZUK AND KHWAKHEY INGOR NOVELS

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### Abstract

*There are some shared geographical, linguistic and religious features in a multicultural society of Pakistan that are found in the literature of various ethnic and linguistic groups within Pakistan. These shared features tied the Pakistani nation and helped in national integration, making common cultural heritage and national identity. In the above context, this article attempts to explore prominent features in Baloch and Pashtun cultures as depicted in the two novels Nazuk and Khwakhey Ingor, respectively written in Balochi and Pashto languages in the second half of the twentieth century. These novels have been contextualized in the literary history of their respective literatures. This article also aims to know common as well as uncommon cultural features in Baloch and Pashtun societies. Both of the novels are important in their respective literatures. Nazuk is the first novel in Balochi language. Khwakhey Ingor is also a popular and well-known novel in Pashto language. Inductive and deductive thematic analysis approach has been employed in this research.*

**Key Words:** Balochi novel, Pashto novel, literature, culture, Baloch, Pashtun.

### Introduction

*Nazuk* is the first Balochi novel, written by Sayyed Zahoor Shah Hashmi who is the founder of Balochi Novel (Mari, 2009). He has borne on 21<sup>st</sup> April, 1926 A.D. in Gawadar, Balochistan (Sabir, 1999). The novel describes the life style of the coastal Baloch society (Mari, 2009). A glimpse of the life of people, living near sea forts is found in this novel (Hashmi, 1995). This novel was been published after

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the death of the writer (Sabir, 1999). It has been translated into Urdu by Ghaus Bakhsh Sabir. Basically ‘*Nazuk*’ was a short story written by the author round about in 1958-59. Later on, in 1969, he prolonged it and converted into a novel (Hashmi, 1995).

A Pashto novelist from Swat, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shabnam<sup>2</sup> also wrote a novel ‘*Khwakhey Ingor*’ (Mother-in-law & Daughter-in-law) in this period i.e in nineteen sixties.<sup>3</sup> This novel has been published in 1973. This novel describes some social evils of Pashtun’s society (Bukhari, 2004/1973). The purpose behind the writing of the novel ‘*Khwakhey Ingor*’ is based on a struggle against the bad and ignorant customs, quarrels among family members and blind actions of the Pashtuns (Shabnam, 2004/1973). In this novel the oppression, spendthriftness, vulgarity, foolishness, and wasting the wealth, by the cruel and powerful *Khans* have been described (Shabnam, 2004/1973). The main theme of this novel is the traditional quarrel between Mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law. In the story of the novel, a mother-in-law detests her daughter-in-law on account of giving birth to a female child and at last the daughter-in-law is compelled to leave the home (Abid: 2006). Although the life style has been changed but the traditional hatred and quarrels between Mother-in-law and daughter-in-law still exists (Shabnam, 2004/1973).

Although Pakistan is a multilingual and multicultural country but some shared historical, geographical, linguistic, social and cultural features as well as religion caused cultural and social commonalities in a multicultural country. Disregard to other cultures of Pakistan, Baloch and Pashtuns have some common social traits. Among all Pakistani languages, Balochi and Pashto (Sindhi, 1992) belong to one linguistic group, the Indo-Iranian group of languages (Mari, 2009). The common and uncommon elements of Baloch and Pashtun cultures, as depicted in these two novels have been explored. Cultural similarities in Pashtun and Baloch cultures have also been discussed.

## **Culture and Cultural Area**

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<sup>2</sup> Although this novel has been published in 1973 but the author of the novel told to the writer of this article in an interview on 4<sup>th</sup> April 2011, that this novel has been started in 1960 and completed in 1963.

<sup>3</sup> Date of birth of the author of the novel, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shabnam is 1940. his father’s name is Abdul Hamid Khan. He belongs to a well to do family of Darush-khela, Swat. He died on 15<sup>th</sup> April 2021.

Before proceeding forward, to analyse the Baloch and Pashtun cultures in the mentioned above two novels, it is necessary to define and understand culture. Culture is a comprehensive, all inclusive and compact term. Much has been said about the definition and explanation of culture. Culture is defined by anthropologists and other social scientists as learned behavior acquired by individuals as members of a social group. Edward B. Tylor, a British anthropologist, defined the term explicitly in 1871. He used the term to refer to “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Since then anthropologists have offered numerous refinements and variations on this definition, but all have agreed that culture is learned behavior in contrast to genetically endowed behavior. Each human society has a body of norms governing behavior and other knowledge to which an individual is socialized, or encultured, beginning at birth. Culture in this sense is different from the concept of culture used to describe a highly cultivated person who is versed in music, literature, philosophy and other intellectual pursuits associated with civilized life. Human culture in the technical sense includes the insignificant and mundane behavior traits of everyday life, such as etiquette and food habits, as well as the refined arts of a society.” (Academic American Encyclopedia, 1980/1983) Two terms “culture” and “Civilisations” are often intermingled while explaining. “Fernand Braudel, too, regards culture as a specific stage in the overall evolution of mankind, which is lower than civilization, as a matter of fact; he even believes that culture could be seen as a ‘semi-civilization’.” (Ruan, 2011) In this research paper culture of two different areas have been described. Therefore, it is necessary to know that what a cultural area is.

A cultural area is a geographic region within which the human population share similar culture traits, patterns of cultural ecology, and a similar way of life....cultural boundaries are often coincide with the physical barriers that separate human populations. Such barriers are bodies of water, mountain ranges, deserts, and large unpopulated stretches of land. Social, political, religious, or historical boundaries also may be preserved solely on the basis of strict adherence by one or both groups to traditional ways of life (Academic American Encyclopedia, 1983/1980).

### **Evolution of Balochi literature**

Balochi Language is spoken in the present Balochistan since 550 BC (Rizvi, 2007). Varieties of Balochi are spoken in Afghanistan,

Iran and Turkmenistan. There is an additional case in the dialect of Balochi spoken in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. The dialect of Balochi which is spoken in Turkmenistan possess a case which is not found in other Balochi dialects (Korn, 2008). Baloch living in Turkmenistan have unique features. They greatest degree of resistance of language assimilation as compared to other ethnic minority groups living in the region under USSR. They have maintained their strong ethnic identity (Kokisl & Kokaislova, 2019). Balochi literature has been started through folk stories. Balochi folk stories are very popular and story tellers were telling these stories skillfully. Musicality is the main feature of these folk stories which helped in the growth and development of Balochi poetry. These stories consist of myths and other worldly realities. Whatsoever but each story has a moral (Mari, 2009). According to Mir Mitha Khan Mari, the ancient Balochi literature is a "Literature for life". Life of tribal Baloch people depends upon the rearing of cattle and other livestock. They were not interested in farming but only searching for meadows. Therefore, stability and development in their society is comparatively less than that of other agricultural society. Nomadic life compelled them always to be in movement and they did not take any interest in civic life. They did not give attention to the importance of basic formal education. They were being trained by their environment according to the needs of their simple life. Their music is simple and needs no complex instruments. Main themes and topics of their poetry are rain, natural scenes, war or love (Mari, 2009). Poets and poetry were highly valued by the people and each tribe had a tribal poet for creating war poetry. Balochi literature can be divided into following four periods.

1. Ancient Classical Period
2. Literature of the Period of Feudalism of Khawanin-i-Qilaat
3. Anti Imperialism Period (*Samraj Dushman Dawar*)
4. Modern Balochi Literature

### **1. Ancient Classical Period**

This period is also called 'Rind Age'(Rizvi, 2007). It starts from 1450 AD to 1555 AD (Buzdar, 2007). Classical Balochi poetry reflects tribal life. Balochi classical poetry is a main source of Baloch history. Poetry in this period transmitted orally from generation to generation. Majority of the poetry has been lost in this poetry. Baloch people in this period were nomads. They fight each other for meadows. Dominant theme of this period is tribal war. However, romantic poetry is also found in this period. Thematically, poetry of this period is



divided into two categories that are war and romantic poetry. Romantic themes turned Balochi poetry into immortality. Poetry of this period consists of long poems with no proper rhyme scheme but with musicality and rhythm. (Jamil, n.d) In this period the people doing farming and were stable. They were not following nomadic life. The stories of Haani Sheh Mureed, Beevragh O Granaz and Shehdad O Mehnaz belong to this period. This period is also called the period of Beevragh. Beauty is found in the literature of this period. Sheh Mureed, a poet of this period, not only sighing in response to the disloyalty of his beloved but also mentions his rival. He also describes the ruthless and amoral activities of Mir Chakar, as a chief of tribe, against the poor and lower-class people of the society. As a chief he snatches money from poor people. He makes conspiracies against the noble and brave people and kills them. Main themes of the poetry of this period are horrors of war, killing of humans, description of brave deeds, satire on cowards, hunger, famine and migration due to war and many others (Mari, 2009). It is an age of fluent, musical and meaningful poetry. It is an age of epic poetry and an age of deep love and nearness to nature (Mari, 2009). Notable poets of this period are: Mir Chakar Khan Rind, Mir Bioragh Rind, Sardar Goharam Lashari, Mir Rehan Rind, Sheh Murid, Mir Shehdad Rind, Mir Jamal Rind, Sheh Mubarak.

## **2. Feudalism Period**

This era is also called the era of Puritan poets (Rizvi, 2007). In this period Baloch have adopted an agricultural life. It is also called the 'Period of Khawanin-i-Qilaat.' Persian was the official language in this period. Main themes of poetry are love and religious topics. New genres are also seen in this period. Jam Durak, Mula Fazil and Mula Qasim, Mast Tawkali, Rahman Chakrani, Jawansal Bugti, Behram Jakrani, Huzor Bukhsh Jatoi, Mula Abdul Nabi Rind, Mula Izat Panjgori, Mula Ibrahim Sarbazi, and Mula Bahram Sarbazi are the prominent poets of this period (Mari, 2009).

## **3. Anti Imperialism Period**

In this age movements of cultural as well as political revival are found (Buzdar, 2005). Dominant themes of the literature of this period are resistance and religion. Mysticism and chivalry are also prominent in the literature of this period. Humour and satire in Balochi literature reached to its peak in this period. For the first time prose is found in Balochi language in this period. Prose of this period has been categorized as Semi political, resistance and anti-Imperialism prose

(Mari, 2009). Prominent poets of this age are Raham Ali Mari, Bajar Mari, Mast Tawkali, Jawansal Bugti, and Mula Muhammad Hasan Raisani (Rizvi, 2007).

#### **4. Modern Balochi Literature**

Modern period starts after the independence of Pakistan in 1947. Numerous literary genres from other languages have been imported in Balochi literature in this era (Mari, 2009). Prominent contemporary poets and writers are: Syed Zahoor Shah Hashmi, Ata Shad, Murad Sahir, Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Momin Buzdar, Ishaq Shamim, Malik Muhammad Toqi, Sadiq Akbar, Akbar Barakzai, Murad Awarani, Mir Abdul Qayyum Baloch, Mir Mitha Khan Mari and Malik Muhammad Panah.

#### **Prose in Balochi Literature**

As started earlier that in the 3<sup>rd</sup> period which called as era of anti imperialism, for the first time prose emerged in Balochi language. Balochi prose has been started in 18<sup>th</sup> century. In beginning, Arabic and Persian scripts were in vogue (Rizvi, 2007). Development of is subdivided into three periods.

1. First Period: from 18<sup>th</sup> century till 1940.
2. Second Period: from 1940 to 1950.
3. Third Period: from 1950 till to date (Mari, 2009).

#### **Novels in Balochi**

The number of novels in Balochi language is not considerable because there are not a lot of novels. According to Ghawas Bakhsh reason of less number of novels in Balochi language is lack of attention of the writers give no attention to novel because they are trying to preserve the unwritten and oral literature and history of Balochi first (Sabir, 1999). A few other novelists in Balochi language are: Asghar Zaheer, Khuda Bakhsh Buzdar, Ghani Parwaz, Muner Ahmad Badeeni, and Abdul Sattar Purdali. Syed Zahoor Shah Hashmi is the founder of Balochi novel. The name of his novel is *Nazuk*. It depicts coastal Baloch society. It has been translated into Urdu by Ghawas Bakhsh Sabir.

#### **Evolution of Pashto Literature**

Like almost all of the languages of the world, Pashto also has a very old tradition of folk literature. Jens Enveldson has traced back the Pashto folklore to 1500 BC (Khalil, 2009). In Pashto literature, poetry is first which is followed by prose. First known Pashto poet is Amir

Kror, the son of Amir Faulad Sori. Amir Kror became the ruler (*Hakim*) of Mandish (Ghor) in 139 A.H (Hotak, 1399AH). According to Abdul Hai Habibi the history of Pashto literature is traced back to 120 A.H (Shah, 2005). He also claimed that stone inscription of King Dara Yoush Kabir bear Pashto. These stones have been carved in 516 BC (Abid, 2006). Formally the development of Pashto literature has been divided into four periods.

1. The Age of Sori, Ghoris and Lodhis: from 139 A.H (718 AD) to 900 A.H (1494 AD)
2. The age of Babur and his descendants: From 901 A.H (1495 AD) to 1100 A.H (1687 A.D)
3. Age of Hotak and Sadozis: from 1101 A.H (1688 AD) to 1250 A.H (1834AD)
4. The Age of Muhammad Zai to present day: From 1251 A.H (1835 AD) (Abbasi, 1969)

To easily understand, Pashto literary development has been divided into following three periods.

### **First Period: From Amir Kror to Khushal Khan Khatak.**

In the literary works of early literature there are no high imagination and lofty ideas. Language is simple and easy language in early period. Main themes of Pashto literature in this period are *Hamd* (Praise of Allah) *Naat* (praise of Prophet PBUH), elegies, depiction of natural scenes, teachings of moral and religious education, Sufism and mysticism etc. Persian and Arabic languages have little impact on Pashto literature before the 5<sup>th</sup> century Hijri.

### **Second Period: From Khushal Khan Khatak till the end of Nineteenth century.**

This is a rich period in the history of Pashto literature. This period is also called the age of Khushal Khan Khatak, because a versatile poet like khushal belongs to this age. His poetry has vast range of matters and themes. Mysticism, politics, ethics, medicines, hunting and a lot of other themes are found in his literary works. During this period Arabic and Persian languages have influenced Pashto language and literature (Abbasi, 1969).

### **Third Period: from the beginning of twentieth century till today.**

In this period important political and social changes occurred in the history of Sub-continent. Western culture and civilization spread

over here. These colonial impacts are found in the Pashto literature of this period (Abbasi, 1969).

### **Prose in Pashto Literature**

The founder of Roshanite movement, Bayazid Ansari, is considered the harbinger of Pashto prose. His prose book '*Khair-ul-Bayan*' is the first known and available complete book in Pashto prose (Shah, 2005). This book has been written nearly in 980 A.H (Abid, 2006). Another book has also been mentioned in the literary history of Pashto that is '*Da Salo Wagma*' by Muhammad Abu Hasham Ibni Zaid Alsarwani Albasti (223-297 A.H) (Abid, 2006). A few pages of Sulaiman Mako's book '*Tazkirat-ui-Awliya*' written in 612 A.H (1215AD) have also been discovered by Abdul Hai Habibi. Another book written by Muhammad Ali Albasti's titled '*Tarikh-i-Sori*' is also mentioned in history (Shah, 2005). A few other important books about Pashto classical prose are: *Makhzanul Islam*, *Dastarnana*, and *Tarikh-i-Murassa* etc (Afghani, 1371 AH).

### **Novels in Pashto**

Novel has come to Pashto from Urdu through translation. At first, Mian Haseeb Gul Kaka Khel translated Mulvi Nazir Ahmad's novel *Mirat-ul-Uroos* into Pashto language by the name of *Naqsh-i-Nagin* in 1876 AD. Later on, Mian Muhammad Yousaf Kaka Khel translated '*Taubatun Nasoooh*' another novel of Mulvi Nazir Ahmad into Pashto language in 1905 (Abid, 2006). First creative novel in Pashto language is '*Natija-i-Ishaq*' or '*Mah Rukh*' written by Syed Rahat Zakheli and published in 1912 AD (Abid, 2006). Later on a lot of novels have been written in Pashto language and a lot of others have been translated from other languages of the world.

### **Pashto Novels in Swat**

Swat has its distinctive cultural, political, geographical and literary significance. In the development of Pashto language and literature, Swat has played a great role (Ali, 2011). Many influential poets and writers in Pashto literature belong to Swat (Dinakhel, 2013). Pashto was the sole official language of Swat State (1915-1969) declared as official language in June 1937 (Dinakhel, 2020). More than one dozen Pashto novels have been written in Swat. A few names are given below.

1. *Naway Jwand* [New Life] (1964) Sher Muhammad Sher
2. *Lawaz* [Promise] (1966) Sher Muhammad Sher

3. *Khwakhey ingor* [Mother-in-law Sister-in-law] (1973) Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shabam
4. *Rajgana* (1989) by Rahim Shah Rahim
5. *Bibi Mubarak* (1991) Rahim Shah Rahim
6. *Ajara* (1994) Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shabnam
7. *Da Dasht-i-Looth Musafar* (1996) Faında Muhammad Khan
8. *Torona Sazakhtona* (1997) Badr-ul-Hakim Hakimzai
9. *Da Sind pa Ghara Tagi*, Khair-ul-Hakim Hakimzai
10. *Allah au Bhagwan* (2002) Faında Muhammad Khan
11. *Gulalai* (2005) Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shabnam
12. *Sikandar-i-Azam* (2005) Rahim Shah Rahim

Among these novels '*Khwakhey Ingor*' will be discussed in cultural context. It will be analysed in the light of Pashtun culture. It will also be compared with Baloch culture as depicted in the first Balochi novel '*Nazuk*'.

### **Relationship of Balochi and Pasho Language**

Balochi language has been surrounded by Persian, Sindhi, Pashto and Punjabi for hundreds of years. Belonging to same geography these languages have influenced each other. In this broader context, impacts of Pashto and other Pakisani languages on Balochi language are found (Malik, 2006). Balochi and Pashto (Habibi, 2005) belong to the same family of languages i.e. Indo Iranian group of languages (Katzner, n.d.).

### **Short Summary of Balochi first Novel '*Nazuk*'**

This novel has encompassed the social and cultural conditions of coastal Baloch people (Sabir, 1995). *Nazuk* is the multidimensional glimpse of the life of those people who are living in the coasts near small sea fortes (Hashmi, 1995).

### **Short Summary of Pashto Novel '*Khwakhey Ingor*'**

In this novel the story of the traditional quarrels between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, is described. Numerous other social problems in Pashtun society have also been described. Causes of evil customs and family quarrels have been narrated.

### **Baloch Culture in *Nazuk* Novel**

In Baloch society, there is an Attachment with spiritual leaders (*Pir, Murshid*). Baloch coastal people have great attachment with their *Pir, Murshid* (Sabir, 1995). Like other tribal societies, Baloch

also have feelings of Nationalism. Every Baloch person feels proud of being a Baloch (Sabir, 1995).

Behaviour and character of the feudal is found in the novel. All of the poor people consider these feudal as the main cause of their poverty (Sabir, 1995). Poor people are being exploited by these feudal (Mari, 2009). All of the poor people are of the opinion that even a minute kindness of these feudal is not without any greed and entanglement (Sabir, 1995). They capture poor people by their kindness and compelled them to be their brokers for their dirty things (Sabir, 1995). Chiefs of tribes keep young poor girls as their servants and then sexually harassing them (Sabir, 1995). A few young female servants committed suicide on account of their insult by their bosses (Sabir, 1995). These chiefs and feudals are so much morally degraded that they are seeing the women walking on the sea shore while the wind blowing their clothes (Sabir, 1995). These people are hen-pecked (Sabir, 1995). They afraid of their women and all of the powers are in the hands of their women (Sabir, 1995). These ruling class people are smugglers (Sabir, 1995). As they don't care about the respect of poor women that is why character of their women is not so much good (Sabir, 1995).

Baloch believe in superstitions like bad and good omen and many more. They believe in every type of superstitions and omens (Sabir, 1995). Whenever a man goes out of home, calling upon him is considered a bad omen (Sabir, 1995). A widow woman is considered as bad omen (Sabir, 1995). They also believe in dreams (Sabir, 1995). They have their own traditional and local food. Baloch coastal people described in this novel usually take these meals: *Halwa*, *Loby*, *Kajha*, Rice, *Malaye* (Sabir, 1995).

Giving asylum to an oppressed one is a feature of Baloch culture. Baloch people bear every type of difficulties and hardships and give sacrifices while giving asylum to an oppressed person (Sabir, 1995). Usually, Baloch women are working. Usually, poor Baloch women help their husbands in every matter. In this regard poor and elder women sell food stuffs on coast (Sabir, 1995). Weaving is also a profession of a few women (Sabir, 1995). This novel also describes love affairs of Feudal Baloch Women. In feudal class unmarried, young and some time married women have secret relations with their lovers and giving them gifts in shape of oil, handkerchief and other little things (Sabir, 1995). Whenever the husband of a woman is abroad, she also does the same thing (Sabir, 1995). This type of relation and

exchange of gifts have also been described in the following Pashto Tapa:

*Rasha Romal Gumanz di wakhla*

*Na di yari kram na di nakhey garzawuma.*

Translation: Come and take back your handkerchief and comb/ Neither I continue friendship with you nor I like to have your symbols of love with myself.

They have their own local ways to measure time. Almost all of the Baloch people are very hard working. They get up almost at mid night when hens and cocks are crying. They consider the crying of these cocks and hens a suitable time for themselves (Sabir, 1995). Dusk and dawn, day and night and crying of these birds are measurement sources of time for Baloch tribal and coastal people. Women have powers and responsibilities in domestic matters. Protection and use of all of the property available in the home, is the responsibility of a women. Usually, a woman has keys of home in her custody hanging around her neck (Sabir, 1995).

Baloch also fight upon Patrimony (*Miras*). Usually, Baloch tribal people have quarrels upon hereditary estate or legacy (Sabir, 1995). Baloch wives have a respect for their husband. Poor Baloch women respect their husbands from the core of heart. They help them in every matter. They give due respect to their husbands. When they are calling their husbands, they don't call them by their names but by the name of their children (Sabir, 1995). They love their husbands very much and they are waiting painfully whenever in a danger a husband is out of home (Sabir, 1995). But in upper class women are very proud while controlling their husbands (Sabir, 1995). Baloch have a respect of parents. they respect their parents and especially when parents become older, sons don't want them to engage in earning (Sabir, 1995). They are interested in sports and games: Baloch Children (small boys), described in this novel, usually play these games: *Gariko*, *Laddi*(Sabir, 1995), *Talak Gozi*(Sabir, 1995), *Satki (uchal Phand)*, *Kapi*, *Bazari*(Sabir, 1995). Baloch small girls are playing "*Manko ka khail*" (Sabir, 1995).

They have their particular thinking about women. Women are being beaten for minute and petty things (Sabir, 1995). Generally, women are considered as coward (Sabir, 1995). A husband considers it a matter of shame for himself to consult his matters with his wife. That is why whenever he wants to go; he does not like to tell his wife (Sabir, 1995). Common people respect each and every woman and consider

them as their relatives (Sabir, 1995). It is thought that a morally degraded woman can defame the whole family (Sabir, 1995). They don't believe in the freedom of women. Sometime they behave with them strictly and some time women are divorced if they attend the marriage of their relatives or fellow without permission of her husband (Sabir, 1995). Women think that usually men are feeling doubts about women in every matter (Sabir, 1995). A woman of bad character can't be affected by husband's reproachment (Sabir, 1995). Tribal Baloch use indigenous ways of treatment and also use folk medicines. Herbal and simple medicines are used for the treatment of different diseases (Sabir, 1995).

### **Pashtun Culture in *Khwakhey Ingor* Novel**

Hujra is the common guest house in every Pashtun village. Hujra was managed by the *Khan* and *Malak* of a village. *Malak* of a village has a few servants for his hujra (Shabnam,2004/73). Pashtun prefers his son rather than his daughter. Whenever a daughter born in a Pashtun family, they become worried. They feel shame of having a daughter in his home(Shabnam,2004/73). Pashtun consider a daughter as a bad omen and misfortune (Shabnam,2004/73).

Servants have loyalty for their Khans. The servants of a *khan* are so much loyal and faithful to him that even they ready to die for the protection and service of *Khan* (Shabnam,2004/73). Landless, low caste and professional people are always looking down upon in Pashtun society. Low caste people, artisans, nomadic people, singers and weavers are always being looking down upon (Shabnam,2004/73). Bad customs and rituals of the Pashtuns have been criticized by the oppressed people of the society i.e. women, professionals and low caste people (Shabnam,2004/73). Pashtun believe in destiny or luck and fate. Pashtuns are hard workers but some time they surrender themselves to luck and consider it as a hurdle in their way of progress and development (Shabnam,2004/73).

Abusing and cursing are also found in Pashtun society. Pashtun men are abusing while in anger and Pashtun women are cursing whenever they are angry but sometimes women are also abusing (Shabnam,2004/73) other women in a quarrel (Shabnam,2004/73). A lot of things related to material culture are found in homes but now- a-days these things are not using and day by day they are disappearing. Among them a few names are: *Tawnai*, *Kandwan* etc(Shabnam,2004/73). These are wooden boxes for storing grain.



Custom of engagement in childhood: Though it is not available now a days but in early days whenever a women give birth to a daughter, on the spot her daughter was engaged to someone's son (Shabnam, 2004/73).

Women fight each other and blames each other at their homes. Traditional quarrel is that of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Moreover, there are also quarrels and blames among the other women of a home (Shabnam, 2004/73).

Pashtuns have their own ways of naming a Child. In early time, whenever a child born. The baby was taking to mosque for a *Mulla* to name the baby (Shabnam, 2004/73). Pashtuns believe in superstitions and myths. Pashtuns believe in various types of superstitions and myths. Especially Pashtun women believe in these things. For example, when someone is leaving home, throwing water is considered as a good omen (Shabnam, 2004/73). Different types of punishments are giving in various crimes. The face is blackened of a bad character man or women (Shabnam, 2004/73). On the seventh day of the birth of a child, a hair cutting ceremony is celebrated which is called *mariji*(Shabnam,2004/73). Taking bath of a woman after forty days of giving birth to a child is also a ritual. After forty days of a child's birth, a woman takes bath. This is considered a happy event. Special tea and foods are being prepared on this occasion for the woman (Shabnam, 2004/73). Circumcision ceremony is also celebrated with great pump and show (Shabnam, 2004/73). In the novel of Ibrahim Khan Shabnam, one can know about traditional and cultural food of Swat. *Warjalay* or *Chokanr* is the traditional food of Swat. Rice is cooked with *Shawtal* (a local vegetable) and this is called *Chokan* or *warjaley*(Shabnam,2004/73). Khan don't like to be a *mulla*. *Mulla* is considered as a low caste person. Therefore, a *khan* doesn't like to be a *mulla* (Shabnam, 2004/73). Adherence of a Pashtun with his words and promise is considered a basic feature of Pashtunwali. A Pashtun doesn't go against his promise and words, if it is right or wrong (Shabnam, 2004/73).

Pride of being a Pashtun: Every Pashtun feels proud on his Pashtun identity and consider themselves superior as compared to other ethnic groups living around them (Shabnam,2004/73).

Love affairs in Pashtun society is strictly forbidden. Morally corrupted and degraded people have defamed the true essence of love. Therefore, nobody is allowed openly to indulge in love affairs with a woman (Shabnam, 2004/73). Pashtuns have a respect and reverence for Friday:

Pashtuns, being Muslims, have a reverence for Friday and other sacred days. Special measures and preparations are taken for this day (Shabnam, 2004/73). Hospitality is an important element of Pashtunwali. Pashtuns consider hospitality as their moral obligation.

Fighting upon Patrimony (*Miras*) are also found in Pashtun society. Usually Pashtun tribal people have quarrels upon hereditary estate or legacy. Keeping young daughter or sister without marriage at home is a matter of shame. Every Pashtun tries his best for the early marriage of his young daughter or sister (Shabnam, 2004/73). An engaged girl shouldn't see her fiancé before marriage. It was considered a matter of great shame for both the engaged boy and girl to look or talk with each other before their proper marriage (Shabnam, 2004/73). Moreover, a boy can't utter even the name of his wife in front of his parents, before marriage (Shabnam, 2004/73). Pashtun think after taking an action. They want to be praised by others. That is why flatterers are taking advantage of their weak points (Shabnam, 2004/73).

Generally, Pashtuns celebrate marriage ceremony with great pomp and show but the poor ones prefer a simple way in this regard (Shabnam, 2004/73). Golden ornaments are prepared for bride and *walima* is given (Shabnam, 2004/73). Wedlock (*Nikah*) is arranged by a *mulla* and *mahar* is also decided (Shabnam, 2004/73). Elders are respected in Pashtun society and their experiences in worldly matters are appreciated and utilized (Shabnam, 2004/73).

Tidings is also a part of Pashtun culture. Whenever someone share a good news, the communicator is paid money which is called *Ziray* (Shabnam, 2004/73). Women are respected in Pashtun society. Women are respected everywhere and especially in critical situation everyone is ready to help them. If someone found his enemy along with a woman, he avoids the opportunity of taking revenge for the sake of woman (Shabnam, 2004/73). Killing of a woman in war or snatching wealth from her is considered a very coward action in a Pashtun society (Shabnam, 2004/73). Women are considered inferior in wisdom as compared to men. Generally, women are considered inferior in wisdom as compared to men. Therefore, they are not being consulted in important matters, and secrets are not being shared with them (Shabnam, 2004/73).

## Conclusion

Balochi and Pashto belong to the same Indo-Iranian group of languages. As compared to Balochi language, Pashto has rich literary

tradition. Number of novels in Pashto language is more than the number of novels in Balochi language. Baloch and Pashtun cultures as depicted in the novels *Nazuk* and *Khwakhey Ingor*, have many common and shared features. Some distinctive cultural features in both of these ethnic and linguistic groups are also found as depicted in these novels. Baloch and Pashtun Cultures depicted in these two novels have undergone some changes which mean that all of the cultural features mentioned in these novels are not intact. Modern education and media have influenced many elements in Baloch as well as in Pashtun society. Shared geography, state language, media and religion have caused cultural commonalities in Baloch and Pashtun societies.

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## EFFECT OF SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER ON STUDENTS' ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT ACROSS THE UNIVERSITY YEARS

Parveen Khan<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

*The purpose of this study was to investigate the association between social anxiety and academic performance of university students. Sixty students participated in the study. The participants were taken from Institute of Education and Research (B.ED Hons), through simple random sampling. Social phobia inventory scale was used to identify the social anxiety among students. Responses of students were analyzed through SPSS version 20. Besides this Chi-square independence test and regression was used for data analysis. The impact of social anxiety on academic performance was investigated by examining the GPAs of students. Levine's T-test model was used to analyze data of two groups that is the high and low scorer students. The P-value is .333 greater than 0.05, which is insignificant. The result shows no effect of social anxiety on the academic performance of students.*

**Key Words:** *Social anxiety, academic performance, university students.*

### Introduction

Anxiety is quite a common occurrence that almost everyone experiences when they have to take any interview, make a presentation, attend any seminar and face experienced people on the very first day of the event concerned. But when such anxiety becomes serious the issue occurs, and a person becomes more self-conscious and ignore in attending any kind of social gathering (Veale, 2003).

A student with social anxiety also worries about the previous practices and cannot concentrate on teacher lectures and demonstration. And this leads to develop stress in student life (Abraham, 2018). Socially anxious students are at high risk of low academic as well as professional success. They never show interest in improving their performance in schools (Van Ameringen et al., 2003).

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According to Abi-Najem (2015) students suffering from social anxiety typically face a salient war. For such students participation in the class is very difficult. They are reluctant to answer the questions when teacher ask from them, although they know the correct answers. They are keen to answer the question but something secret stops them. Class participation at university level holds a lot of importance, as 20% marks is granted to students on the basis of class participation. Because of the fear of being negatively viewed by the participants, significantly affects students' grades. Socially nervous students do not engage in events and group discussion. Most of the people can't talk to a group of people, but they generally conquer their fear in a few minutes when they start their speech, and they can boldly persuade the crowd.

The situation is different for students with social anxiety disorder rather than concentrating on the subject of presentation as they are more worried about their shivering hands, soaring voice, dry mouth and rapid heartbeat. These students usually confront different issues in delivering speech and seeking help from teachers (Cuncic, 2019).

In addition to school social anxiety also has significant effect on the employment of individuals with social anxiety. The career goals of socially insecure individuals are different from those of normal individuals (Himle et al., 2014).

Job sectors need knowledgeable people who can effective communicate and have a high degree of social interaction. Societal engagement and communication skills are very important in every area in today's world. People with social phobia avoid jobs that involve high social contact that greatly affects the development of their careers (Carnevale et al., 2010). Social phobia is considered as one of the main factor in refusal of school by most of the students (Conlon, 2016). According to Russell and Shaw (2009) in UK different researches were conducted and it was revealed from the result that 10% of scholars suffered from acute social anxiety disorder.

Despite the encouraging remarks of the audience and judges, socially insecure learners engaging in presentations or seminars often judge their competence poorly. The individuals still underestimate and weaken themselves in spite of academic accomplishments (Austin, 2004). Socially anxious students face a lot of tension in the undergraduate programme, where lectures, peer work, community events and debates are the core of the overall education. Such immersive events only consciously include emotionally confident

students. On the other hand, such people have to bear a great tension between their willingness to participate in the activity and their fear of negative judgments and humiliation. Despite the fact that it affects student academics in higher education (Strahan and Conger, 1998), social anxiety disorder has not received publicity.

A study was carried by Sholeh et al. (2018), the study concluded that social interaction, anxiety and academic change have a negative relationship. It is also stated that social anxiety has a significant effect on fresh college students' academics. The students who were victim of social anxiety shows low grades and vice versa. Social anxiety disorder is a significant challenge in many areas of college life and also involves academic aspects.

The relationship between shyness and academic achievement among adolescents in Karachi was investigated by Kanzah et al. (2018). The analysis presumed that the two variables had a significant relation. The study concluded that the connection between shyness and academic achievement is significantly negative. Clarke and Fox (2017) conducted research to assess the effect of social anxiety disorder on six Irish students' occupational participation. The researchers concluded from their research that research participants indicated that they were more worried with how others viewed them and defined negative attitudes with themselves. The ability to completely engage in the student role was profoundly affected by this form of over self-consciousness. This attitude prevents them from engaging with others, participating in social events and that is why certain people appear to be dull and disconnected from society.

Rizwan et al. (2015) conducted research to recognize social phobia and its effect on postgraduate girls' academic achievements. Social phobia, according to the report, is a psychological condition that is generally overlooked. The study showed that while the ratio of social anxiety is more prevalent in girls, there is no major impact on students' academic achievement. The findings of this research paper contradict with other studies.

Mazhari et al. (2014) conducted a study among students of the Kerman University of Medical Sciences to find the correlation between social phobia and academic success. The study concluded that there was no difference between students with and without social anxiety in the Grade Point Average (GPA), but students suffering from anxiety disorder faced serious public speaking difficulties.



Wagner et al. (2014) investigated the social anxiety disorder among students of Brazilian university. The study showed that this mental illness strongly affects academic achievement, learning abilities public speaking and relationships with teachers and classmates.

Russell and Topham (2012) conducted a study to find out the effect of social anxiety on higher education students' learning and well-being. The study concluded that social phobia is a disguised disorder that affects students' learning and wellbeing. Activities involving public speaking may cause social phobia. The study proposed that teachers should be adequately able to distinguish between social anxiety and shyness, and should provide, to those who is suffering from social anxiety, with pedagogical help.

A study was carried out by Al Khafaji (2012) to evaluate the prevalence of social phobia and its effect on the academic performance of Al Qadissya medical students. The study concluded that social phobia is more prevalent in female students than in male students. It was recorded that eating or speaking in public was the most frequently feared situation faced by socially nervous students. Besides this, the study was the most frequently feared situation faced by socially nervous students. Besides this, the study stated that social phobia did not seem to have any impact on students' academics.

In order to find out the influence of shyness on isolation, social anxiety and school love, Walker (2011) conducted a review. The study concluded that, as opposed to other typical children, shyer children are more socially insecure and lonely. Typically, these kids have less positive feelings about education. Shyness is an essential phenomenon in late childhood and such children face problems of adjustment in schools.

Ahmad (2009) conducted a research on psychiatric condition known as social phobia. It was concluded from the study that social anxiety is a major problem that leads to poor academic performance. Study has shown that certain people tend to dislike group work in the classroom, which is now a modern learning strategy for days. One of the reasons for the low academic performance of learners with social anxiety is that they hesitate to ask questions during learning.

Strahan (2002) conducted studies to determine the effect of social anxiety and social skills on academic achievements. The research explored whether or not the two factors that are social anxiety and

social skills impact the college result. This study concluded that emotional instability lower GPA and social anxiety is not a responsible factor for affecting the grades of students.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Most of the students feel anxious in certain situations, even most confident people feel nervous in situations like presentation, seminars, meeting and conferences etc. But the problem lies with those who are over anxious about their social interaction. As this disorder and its impacts on academics are often ignored the researcher preferred to study on the effect of social anxiety on university students' academic performance.

### **Objectives of the Study**

- To find out the association between social anxiety disorder and academic achievement.
- To find the effect of social anxiety on students' academic achievement.

### **Hypotheses of the Study**

H<sub>01</sub> There is no association between social anxiety disorder and academic achievement of students.

H<sub>02</sub> There is no effect of social anxiety disorder on students' academic achievement.

H<sub>03</sub> There is no significant difference between social anxiety and academic achievement.

### **Methodology**

This research is designed as a quantitative research. Quantitative research is a type of research which involves statistical analysis of data. The data of this study is also in numerical form which is analyzed statistically by the researcher using SPSS version 20.

Population of study consisted graduates of B.Ed (Hons) of Institute of Education and Research, University of Peshawar. Total 60 students were taken through simple random sampling (20 students per semester) from 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> semesters. As this is a quantitative research, data was collected through Social Phobia Inventory Scale (SPIN) introduced by Jonathan Davidson in 1995. It is a 17-item self-rating scale for social anxiety disorder. Written permission was taken from Jonathan Davidson. For data analysis different statistical measures were applied such as Chi-square, Levene's Model and Regression.

**Hypothesis -1**

**HO1 There is no association between social anxiety disorder and academic achievement of students.**

S. N	Questions	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	Very much	Extremely	Chi-Square	P-Value
1.	Afraid of people in authority	26 43.3%	22 36.7%	11 18.3%	01 1.7%	0 0%	25.47 6 <sup>a</sup>	0.000
2	Blushing in front of people	12 20.0%	25 41.7%	11 18.3%	09 15.0%	03 5.0%	21.67 7 <sup>b</sup>	0.000
3	Parties and social event scare me	32 53.3%	15 25.5%	08 13.3%	03 5.0%	02 3.3%	50.50 0 <sup>b</sup>	.000
4	I avoid talking to people I don't know	17 28.3%	20 33.3%	13 21.7%	08 13.3%	2 3.3%	17.16 7 <sup>b</sup>	.002
5	Being criticized scares me a lot.	09 15.0%	23 38.3%	10 16.7%	14 23.3%	04 6.7%	29.50 0 <sup>b</sup>	.000
6	Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid doing things or speaking to people	06 10%	26 43.3%	17 28.3%	08 13.3%	03 5.0%	19.16 7 <sup>b</sup>	.000
7	Sweating in front of people causes me distress.	20 33.3%	12 20%	19 31.7%	06 10%	03 5.0%	19.16 7 <sup>b</sup>	.001
8	I avoid going to parties	22 36.7%	19 31.7%	04 6.7%	09 15%	06 10%	21.50 0 <sup>b</sup>	.000
9	I avoid activities in which I am the center of attention	25 41.7%	13 21.7%	13 21.7%	07 11.7%	0.2 3.3%	24.66 7 <sup>b</sup>	.000
10	Talking to strangers	22 22%	38 38%	10 10%	19 19%	11 11%	25.50 0 <sup>a</sup>	.000

	scares me							
11	I avoid having to give speeches	13 21.7%	23 38.3 %	14 23.3%	08 13.3%	02 3.2%	20.16 7 <sup>b</sup>	.000
12	I would do anything to avoid being criticized	16 26.7%	24 40.0 %	12 20%	07 11.7%	1 1.7%	25.50 0 <sup>b</sup>	.000
13	Heart palpitations bother me when I am around people	17 28.3%	16 26.7 %	19 31.7%	04 6.7%	04 6.7%	18.16 7 <sup>b</sup>	.001
14	I am afraid of doing things when people might be watching	16 26.7%	15 25.0 %	20 33.3%	07 11.7%	02 3.3%	17.83 3 <sup>b</sup>	.001
15	Being embarrassed or looking stupid is among my worst fears	09 15.0%	18 30.0 %	20 33.3%	08 13.3%	05 8.3%	14.50 0 <sup>b</sup>	.006
16	I avoid speaking to anyone in authority	29 48.3%	11 18.3 %	12 20%	04 6.7%	04 6.7%	34.83 3 <sup>b</sup>	.000
17	Trembling or shaking in front of others is distressing to me	10 16.7%	17 28.3 %	24 40.0%	08 13.3%	01 1.7%	24.30 5 <sup>b</sup>	.000

### Analysis of Data

- Table no 4.1 indicates that 26(43%) of the respondents gave response to not at all, 22(36%) of them gave a little bit, 22(18.3%) agreed to somewhat whereas only 01(1.7%) agreed to very much whereas chi -square is 25.46 with p-value is 0.000 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05 hence the data is significant.

2. Table 4.2 indicates that 12(20%) of the respondents gave response to not at all, 25(41.7%) of them agreed to a little bit, 11(18.3%) responded to somewhat, 09(15.0%) to very much, and 03(5%) of the respondents gave response to extremely. The value of Chi-square is 21.667 with P-Value 0.000, which is less than the significant that is 0.05, therefore, the data is significant.
3. Table 4.3 indicates that about 32(53.3%) of the respondents gave response to not at all, 15(25%) responded to A little bit, 08(13.3%) agreed to Somewhat, 03(5%) agreed to very much and 02(3.3%) responded to extremely to the given statement. The value of Chi-Square is 50.500 with the P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05. So, the data is significant.
4. Table 4.4 indicates that 17(28.3%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 20(33.3%) gave response to a little bit, 13(21.7%) agreed to somewhat, 08(13.3%) respondents gave response to very much and 02(3.3%) responded to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 17.167 with a P-Value .002 that is less than the significant value which is 0.05 hence the data is significant.
5. Table 4.5 indicates that 09(15%) of the respondents responded to not at all, 23(38.3 %) agreed to a little bit, 10(16.7%) gave response to somewhat 14(23.3%) responded to very much and 04(6.7%) agreed to extremely to the given statement. The value of Chi-Square is 29.500 with P-Value which is less than the significant value that is 0.05. So, the data is significant
6. Table 4.6 indicates that 06(10%) of the respondents gave response to not at all, 26(43.3%) responded to a little bit, 17(28.3%) agreed to somewhat, 08(13.3%) responded to very much while 03(5%) responded to extremely to the given statement. The value of Chi-Square is 19.167 with P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05. So, the data is significant.
7. Table 4.7 indicates that 20(33.3%) of the respondents agreed to not at all 12(20.0%) responded to a little bit, 19(31.7%) gave response to somewhat, 06(10.0%) of the respondents responded to very much and 03(5%) agreed to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 19.167 with P-Value 0.001 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05; therefore, the data is significant.
8. Table 4.8 indicates that 22(36.7%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 19(31.7%) responded to a little bit,

04(6.7%) agreed to somewhat, 09(15.0%) responded to very much and 06(10.0%) gave response to extremely to the statement, whereas the value of Chi-Square with P-value 0.000 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05 so the data is significant.

9. Table 4.9 shows that 25(47.1%) of the respondents responded to not at all, 13(21.7%) responded to a little bit, 13(21.7%) agreed to somewhat, 07(11.7%) gave response to very much and 02(3.3%) responded to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 24.667 with P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value so the data is significant.
10. Table 4.10 indicates that 24(40.0%) of the respondents gave response to Not at all, 20(33.3%) responded to A little bit, 09(15.0%) agreed to somewhat, 03(5.0%) gave response to very much and 04(6.7%) responded to extremely to the statement whereas the value of Chi-Square is 30.167 with P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value 0.05. Therefore the data is significant.
11. Table 4.11 shows that 13(21.7%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 23(38.35%) responded to a little bit, 14(23.3%) agreed to somewhat, 08(13.3%) responded to very much and 02(3.3%) gave response to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 20.167 with P-Value 0.000 that is less than the significant value 0.05 hence the data is significant.
12. Table 4.12 indicates that 16(26.7%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 24(40.0%) responded to a little bit, 12(20.0%) agreed to somewhat, 07(11.7%) responded to very much and 01(1.7%) gave response to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 25.500 with P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05. So, the data is significant.
13. Table 4.13 indicates that 17(28.3%) of the respondents responded to not at all, 16(26.7%) responded to a little bit, 19(31.7%)5 agreed to somewhat, 04(6.7%) gave response to very much and 04(6.7%) responded to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 18.167 with P-Value 0.001 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05 hence the data is significant.
14. Table 4.14 indicates that 16(26.7%) of the respondents responded to not at all, 15 (25.0%) responded to a little bit, 20(33.3%) agreed to somewhat, 07(11.7%) gave response to very much and 02(3.3%) responded to extremely to the

- statement. The value of Chi-Square is 17.833 with P-Value 0.001, which is less than the significant value that is 0.05; therefore, the data is significant.
15. Table 4.15 shows that 09(15.0%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 18(30.0%) responded to a little bit, 20(33.3%) agreed to somewhat, 08(13.3%) gave response to very much and 05(8.3%) responded to extremely to the statement, whereas the value of Chi-Square is 14.500 with a P-Value 0.006 which is less than the significant value that is 0.05. So, the data is significant.
  16. Table 4.16 indicates that 29(48.3%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 11(18.35%) responded to a little bit, 12(20.0%) agreed to somewhat, 04(6.7%) responded to very much and 04(6.7%) gave response to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 34.833 with a P-Value 0.000 which is less than the significant value 0.05 hence the data is significant.
  17. Table 4.17 shows that 10(16.7%) of the respondents, responded to not at all, 17(28.3%) responded to a little bit, 24(40.0%) agreed to somewhat, 08(13.3%) gave response to very much and 01(1.7%) responded to extremely to the statement. The value of Chi-Square is 24.305 with a P-Value .000 which is less than the significant value 0.05. So, the data is significant.

**Analysis**

Table- 4.1 shows that responses of all items are significant which less than 0.05 is. It means that all these statements support the objective No.1. So, the  $H_0$  is rejected.

**Hypothesis- 2**

$H_{02}$  There is no effect of social anxiety disorder on students' academic performance

Model R	R	Adjusted Square	R F	Sig.	
1	.062	.40	-.017	.023	.004

**Analysis**

To test the hypothesis regression analysis was applied. Result of hypothesis showed that R Value is .62 (62%),  $R^2$  is .40 overall

probability value is .004. So, there is no effect of social anxiety disorder on students’ academic performance.  $H_{02}$  is accepted.

**Hypothesis-3**

**$H_{03}$  There is no significant difference between social anxiety and students’ academic achievement.**

**Table 4.19: Levene’s test was used for showing the difference between the results of two groups**

Marks	N	Mean	St.D	T	P-value
Low	40	1.3475	.71754	.791	.333
High	20	1.2000	.59824	.841	

**Analysis**

Table 4.19 revealed the total number of students with low and high GPAs. The mean scores were 1.3475 and 1.2000 respectively, and standard deviation was .71754 and .59824 respectively. The Levene’s T- test model was used for two groups of data i.e students with high and low GPAs. The result shows that the P-value is .333 which is insignificant because it is more than the significant value of 0.05. Hence the result showed that social anxiety has no effect students’ results. So, the  $H_{02}$  is accepted.

**Conclusion**

It was concluded from the current study that students who suffered from social anxiety failed to accept the challenges of life. The fear of being criticized, facing audience, attending and participation in social events, meeting with strangers, lack of confidence made these students anxious and stressed. The current study also reported that although social anxiety exists among students and there is association between social anxiety and academic achievement but it has no significant effect on the GPAs of the students. Hence the findings of this study are in contrast to the other results of other research papers but the findings of this study are in conformity to the study conducted by Strahan (1998) and Rizwan (2015). They also conducted a study to investigate the impact of social anxiety on the academic achievement of students but the results of their study also reported that social anxiety has no effect on the academics of students.



### **5.3 Recommendations**

1. Government and Ministry of Education may pay attention to psychiatric disorders of students, in order to introduce compulsory guidance services at all levels of education.
2. Each educational institution may be provided with a professional guide or counselee as well as psychologist.
3. Seminars regarding the awareness of guidance and counseling may also be arranged for teachers so that they can in turn support students having psychological issues.
4. Government may also provide funds to professional organizations to carry out orientation programs in our educational institutions.
5. Parents-teachers and counselee meetings may be arranged regarding the mental issues of students.

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## INTER-TRIBAL LINKAGES BETWEEN DIR AND AFGHANISTAN: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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### Abstract

*This paper attempts to trace the origin of the linkages between the tribes of Dir and Afghanistan. The tribes of Dir shared and continue sharing linkages of history, culture, ethnicity, origin and religion with Afghanistan. The tribes after migration from Afghanistan, developed a tradition of mutual cooperation and help in the face of any external threat. The Afghan government resisted the arrival of Sikhs in the Pakhtun areas with the help of these tribes. Likewise, Afghanistan extended help to these tribes in all their battles against British and this cooperation continued even after the establishment of Pakistan. Reciprocally, when Afghanistan was invaded in 1979 and then in 2001, thousands of tribesmen crossed over to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Afghans against the invading forces. While reviewing the relevant literature a continuous historical trend of mutual cooperation was noticed between the tribes of Dir and Afghanistan. Despite living in British India and then in Pakistan for a long time, why the tribes of Dir are not properly assimilated? And what are the factors which impel them to turn to Kabul, are the questions the paper attempts to answers by using historical sources.*

**Key Words:** Tribes, Linkages, Dir, Afghanistan, Mutual cooperation.

### Introduction

Located at the very edge of North-Western part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the State of Dir covered an area of 5,280 Km (Shahid, 2007) and was merged with Pakistan on 28 July 1969. The District Dir was sub-divided into Upper and Lower Dir districts in 1996 (Sultani-Rome, 2012). The Pakhtun tribes currently inhabiting Dir share a common religion, ethnicity, history and culture with the tribes across the Durand Line. These linkages owe its existence to the shared territory, Afghanistan, where they lived together for a long time. These tribes migrated to Dir and surrounding areas during the second half of the fifteen century. Despite their migration, they kept their linkages with tribes and government across the border intact (Habib, 2003). Mindful of their affinities, the tribes and rulers of Dir state cultivated

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cordial relation with Afghanistan. Although Dir, for most of its history had been at daggers drawn with its neighboring states of Swat and Chitral but no such evidence of animosity is available against Afghanistan. The study of the available literature reveals that after their migration the tribes developed a tradition of cooperation and assistance with Afghanistan particularly at the time of crisis. They mutually cooperated in all their conflicts with the Sikhs and British (SurrIDGE, 2008). This tradition of cooperation continued even after the merger of Dir state with Pakistan. In the same manner, when Afghanistan was invaded and went into political quagmire the tribes of Dir reciprocated by helping them. The tribesmen of Dir in a large number fought alongside the Afghan fighters against Soviet forces and later joined the Taliban against the US-led NATO forces (Khan N. I., 2010).

### **Migration of the Pakhtun Tribes from Afghanistan and Settlement in Dir**

Most of the Pakhtun tribes presently in possession of the area north of Peshawar up to Dir migrated from Afghanistan. The story of their migration from Afghanistan dates back to the reign of Mirza Ulegh Beg (r.1469-1502) (Samrin, 2007). The Pakhtun tribes, Yusufzai, Mandanr, Tarkalani and Gigyani, collectively known as Khakhi khel or Khashi khel, belong to Sarban who had three sons, i.e. Kand, Zamand and Kasi and Kand had in turn two sons, Khakhi and Ghauri. The other Afghan tribes being Baitan, Ghurghusht and Karlan. The original habitat of the Sarbani Pakhtun tribes i.e. Khakhy Khel and Ghoriah Khel, was Qandahar, a southern province of the present Afghanistan, where they resided side by side for centuries. However, in early 14<sup>th</sup> century quarrel arose between Khakhy Khel and Ghoriah Khel, which ultimately led to the uprooting and departure of Khakhy Khel section of Sarbanri tribe from Qandahar in the direction of north towards Kabul (Caroe, 1958).

These tribes started living in the suburbs of Kabul and raised cattle and cultivated the valleys. Yousuf and Mandanr were more powerful and numerically superior as compared to other sub sections. Meerza Abu Saeed was the Timuride ruler and had delegated the governorship of Kabul to his son, Ulugh Beg. At first Ulugh Beg was on friendly terms with Khakhi Khel and these Afghan tribes had succoured on several occasions. Nonetheless, later the Yusufzais turned recalcitrant and declined to obey him openly. And once they fought him and Mirza was routed as they were greatly numerous and powerful at that time (Shah, 1972).

Once again on the pretext of a peace treaty Ulugh Beg invited them and when the Yusufzai chiefs were assembled, the secretly kept armed men fell upon them. Malik Sulaiman Shah, the chief of tribe implored him to spare his nephew, Malik Ahmad and that spare their children and women so that they may migrate without molestation to some safe haven. Ulugh Beg yielded and consented but all the other persons numbering from 600 to 900 were massacred. The mass grave is still visited and the place is known as Siah Sang, lying in the vicinity of Kabul. This mass grave, also known as Shaheedano Qabar, contains the corpse of Sheikh Usman Malizi and until recently members of his clan from Dir used to visit that tomb. Probably, this gruesome incident occurred in 1480-87.A.D. (Shah, 1972).

After this holocaust, in extreme agony the Yousafzais headed towards Peshawar which was in possession of Dalazaks including the valley till Bajaur. After reaching Peshawar in 1480s, wrecked and exhausted they requested Dalazaks for support and a land for dwelling. Kind enough, the Dalazaks assigned to them the fertile land of Doaba, including land up to Bajaur. They were further advised to acquire for themselves the plan land of Charsadda which was under the occupation of Dehqans, the subjects of Jahangiri ruler of Swat. Due to chaotic political situations, the other sections of Sarbanri line left behind Khakhey Khel, Muhammazais, Tarkalanri, Gigiani and Ghoriah Khel which includes Khalil, Mohmman and Daudzai, had found themselves in hot water. They also migrated and joined Yousafzai. Given the reinforcement of Khakhey confederacy, Ahmad Khan, the chief of Yusufzai tribe allotted them land in the newly acquired area. Buying up this tribal support, Yusufzai got recurrent successes by occupying the whole area north of Peshawar up to Dir (Caroe, 1958). In 1523, during a grand meeting of the notaries of all the Khakhi khel, framed laws and regulations and distributed the acquired lands among sub-tribes. It is known as Sheikh Malli Daftar (Shah P. M., 1972: 203).

### **Allied Tribes of Yusufzais in Dir**

Following in the wake of Yusufzais some other tribes also migrated from Afghanistan and got settled in Dir alongside the Yusufzais.

### ***Uthman Khel***

This is the fourth largest Pakhtun tribe of Kodai branch of the Karlanri lineage. The original habitat of Uthman Khel tribe was located in North West of Suleiman range at Kandahar, Afghanistan. However, they accompanied Yusufzais in their migration to Kabul and then to

Peshawar. Despite their closeness in lineage with Dalazaks who are their Karlanris kinsmen, the Uthman Khel sided with Yousafzais and defeated them (Caroe, 1958). During Yusufzai's occupation of the whole area from Doaba till Dir and Swat, the Uthman Khel remained their allies. Consequently, in Shiekh Mali's distribution of lands, the Uthman Khels were allotted the barren lands of Arang Barang, Agra (Malakand), and Kohi Barmul. Thereafter, they remained completely independent and paid tribute to no one. (Branch, 2018). Following are the major clans of Uthman khel tribe who are still not only possessing the land allotted to them but have moved to the adjoining areas as well.

1. Ismailzai
2. Gorai
3. Mandal
4. Peghozai
5. Alizai
6. Bimmarai
7. Mutakki
8. Sinazai

Instead of a particular area, Uthman khels are scattered in the whole of Dir. The cause of their migration from Arang Barag to Dir is partly due to the infertility and barrenness of their land and partly due to infighting and animosities among the families. They are currently settled in Dir from Malala, Makhai Dara, to Lajbok Dara, which include the areas of Shantai Dara, Malakand Dara, and Islam Dara. They are living in these areas as a tenants of Yusufzais or have bought these land (Shahid, 2007).

### ***Wardag and Mashwani***

They both are Pakhtun tribes who consider themselves as sayyids, descending from Syed Muhammad Gisu Daraz (having long locks). The original habitat of Wardag tribe in Afghanistan was Barmal Ghar of Suliman mountain range. Wardag tribe migrated along Yusufzais and accompanied them in their battle against the Dalazaks. Among the sons of wardag Baba, the descendants of Mayar increased and became clans such as Malak Yar khel, Khuram Khel, Aden Khel and Mesri Khel. On account of their services, they were allotted land in Kalpanri area of Buner along Daulatzai tribe, in Jandul and Barawal in Dir along Malizi tribe while in Swat they were allotted some land along Babuzai tribe. Presently, in Dir they are settled from Barawal to Jandul, Dir proper, Rabat, and Dapur Maidan. Majority of the Wardag are still settled in Afghanistan (Shahid, 2007).

Similarly, among the eight sons of Mashwan Baba, the descendents of Taghmaz increased and became a clan which is further divided into four branches namely Kesorr, Mohmand, Badur and Tarak. In Dir, apart from their presence in Dara Barawal to Jandul, Mashwanis are settled in Dir proper, Rabat, Dapur (Maidan). They are also located

in Srikot, Kundi amarkhan, and Gadwalia. Besides that, Uthmanzai, a sub tribe of Mandnr allotted them the area of Koh-i-kangro. Majority of the Mashwani are still settled in Afghanistan.

### ***Tajak***

Tajak is one of the non-Pakhtun tribes that migrated along others from Afghanistan to Dir. After Uthman Khel, it is the second largest tribe residing in Dir. Muhammad Ameen, the ancestor of Tajak tribe of Dir is buried in the Sattara village of Maidan from where the tribe sprung and got settled in different parts of Dir. Following are the main branches of Tajik tribe in Dir.

Degaan, Marezai, Haji Khel, Akhun Khel

In Dir, they are settled in areas such as Adenzai, Asbanr, Talash, Timargara, Balambat, Malakand, Jandul and Barawal. Tajak, is one of the major non-Pakhtun races presently inhabiting Afghanistan (Ramsay, 1991).

### ***Shenwari***

The ancestor of the Shenwari tribe inhabiting Dir, was one Fakhru-Din, buried in the Sarkhrud area of Afghanistan. The tribe has sprung from that very place in Afghanistan. Fakhru Islam, one of the sons of Faru-Din, on the advice of his father visited Madina and Baghdad for getting religious education. He went on to become one of the respected and famous mystic of this tribe. He is also reverentially known as Sheikh Baba. The Shenwaris of Dir are the descendants of Muhammad Ilyas, the son of Sheikh Baba. The original village of the Shenwaris of Dir is Ghwargi from where they gradually spread in the whole of Dir. Presently, they can be found in Barun, Munjai, Kad, Jarando Dheri, and Hajiabad. On account of their population, Shenwari is one of the smallest tribe of Dir (Shahid, 2007).

### ***Quresh (Saddat)***

Two tribes of the Quresh are settled in Dir. The tribe located in Uch, Talash, Maidan, Kotigram and Ramora, are related to the offspring of Hazrat Fatma (RA). While those living in Batkhela, Moha, and Usheri Dara claim to be the descendent of Hazrat Abu Bakr (RA). Their progenitor Mullah Abdul Qayum had migrated from Kabul to Dir and settled in Usheri Dara (Ramsay, 1991).

Apart from Saddat, there are a large number of Miagaan, the children of religious and pious men. They include Benori Miagan, who are the children of the famous religious Alim, Hazrat Benor and settled



in Adenzai, Chakdara and the surrounding areas. Besides that, Akhun Darweza Miagaan, are the offspring of the famous religious Akhun Darweza. Their forefathers had migrated from Nangrahar Afghanistan to Dir. They are located in Danwa village of Dir (lower) (Khan K. R., 1986).

### ***Syeds, the Offspring of Pir Baba (Syed Ali Shah Tirmizi)***

Pir Baba belonged to a Syed family of Qundoz, Afghanistan. In search of religious knowledge he had come to Ajmer Sharif, and after completing his education, he moved to Buner for the purpose of spreading the religious education among the people. He passed away there and his tomb is located in Buner.

The Syeds of Dir are the Children of Mustafa, the son of Pir Baba who is buried in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan (Khan, 1986). They are currently located in Mian Kali, Kambat, Timargara, Mian Banda, Rabat, Gandegar, Barawal, Ganorai, Dir (proper), Maidan, Kumbar, and Takatak (Shahid, 2007).

### **The Relationship between the Tribes of Dir and Afghanistan**

Ahmad Shah Durrani (b. 1722- d. 1772), a cavalry general under Nadir Shah Afshar (b. 1688- d. 1747), founded the modern state of Afghanistan in 1747. He integrated the area up to Kashmir in East, Indian Ocean in South and Amu Darya in the North, into his empire (Lally, 2018). But the Durrani emperor made no serious effort to bring the Yusufzai country under his direct administrative control. They made allegiance to Ahmad Shah, for his prestige of being an Afghan and founder of a new Afghan state. He exercised great influence over the whole of eastern Pakhtun tribes. But Ahmad Shah never sought to subject to his direct administrative control the tribes of Dir and Swat and instead adopted a policy of matrimonial alliances with tribal Maliks. He caused each tribe to calculate its military strength roughly for his army. Moreover, he distributed Jagirs among Yusufzais and through the grant of services in the army enriched these tribes (Caroe, 1958). This policy enabled Ahmad Shah to overcome the dangers which had threatened to submerge even the armies of Nadir Shah Afshar. He had failed twice to capture Lahore but when the Yusufzais of Dir and other Pakhtun tribes threw in their lot with him, he succeeded in 1749. The Yusufzais had also played a prominent role in the third battle of Panipat against Marathas in 1761 (Caroe, 1958).

After the death of Ahmad shah, his son, Taimur Shah Durrani, proclaimed himself as Amir of Afghanistan in 1773 (Huma Qayun, 2017). He followed the policy of his father by making alliances through marriages with various tribes, and Yusufzais was one of the prominent tribe among them. During Taimur's reign, the tribes of Dir paid their tribute regularly. For which they were not subjected to any additional taxes and were enjoying maximum autonomy. Following the death of their father in 1793, Zaman Shah and Shah Shuja, the sons of Taimur's favourite Yusufzai wife became his successors. Yusufzai tribe tried to sustain the weakening cause of Taimur sons, to whom loyalty of Yusufzais tribe was due through his mother. The Yusufzais twice assisted militarily Shah Shuja in regaining the throne of Kabul in 1801 but failed (Ramsay, 1991).

### **The Role of Eastern Tribes in Afghan Wars with Sikhs**

The Sikh army had started their forays into Peshawar in 1818 and by 1836 had subjugated the Eastern Pakhtun tribes (Caroe, 1958). During the same period, Dost Muhammad Khan, founder of the Barakzai dynasty, supplanted the Durrani and became the king of Afghanistan in 1826. The presence of Sikhs at Jamrud had caused great concern to Dost Muhammad Khan, which was a prelude to expansion into Jalalabad. He cultivated close ties with the Eastern Pakhtun tribes. Mirza Sami Khan, an able minister of the Afghan Amir was deputed to organise resistance with the help of local Pakhtun tribes. All the five sons of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan headed this lashkar. Mir Alam Khan of Bajaur, Saadat Khan Mohmand of Lalpura, were to engage the Sikh garrison of Sardar Lehna Singh Sindianwala at Doaba and Hashtnagar. Similarly, he had invited the cooperation of Abdul Ghaffur, known as Akhund of Swat, against the Sikhs in 1829. Owing to his popularity as a religious person, Akhund had a large following of devotees in the Pakhtun tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajaur. Akhund headed a large contingent of Yusufzais and joined Dost Muhammad at Sheikhan village near Bara. However, in spite of the united front of Pakhtun tribes and saintly presence of Akhund, the Sikhs came out victorious (Ramsay, 1991).

In 1823, the battle of Nowshehra, commonly known as battle of Naukhar (Pirsabak), was fought against the Sikhs in which Azeem Khan, the brother of Dost Muhammad Khan was leading the Afghan forces. In this battle, 20,000 Yusufzais from Sama up to Dir had participated under Akbar Shah, where majority of the Yusufzais were

killed while fighting valiantly. Whereas Azeem Khan and his forces went back to Afghanistan unharmed (Rashid, 2002).

Similarly, during the Great Game between Russia and England, the Russian advanced from Merv hundred miles towards Pajndeh and defeated the Afghan forces in 1885. A mission from Dir, Swat and Buner under Muhammad Qasim and Ahmad Khan went to Kabul and offered their services to Amir Abdur Rehman for Jihad against the foreign invaders. Similar delegates from other Eastern Afghan tribes approached the Amir but he turned them all down with thanks (Marwat, 1997).

### **British Arrival in Malakand Agency and Malakand Ghaza (Holy War)**

Till the arrival and occupation of area by the British, neither their migrations nor the suzerainties of British had brought any fundamental changes in the mode of life of the tribes nor had their identities been drifted away. Common language, religion, code of life and contingency of lands and hills had kept them intact and identical. Memories may have receded but the common folklore kept them alive to their same identity. Durand Line had not severed the ties between the tribes as until recently crossing and re-crossing of it by the tribes for social functions like marriage and death of the kin was a routine phenomenon (Ramsay, 1991). The Pakhtun tribes of Dir and adjacent areas strongly resisted every encroachment in their area of any outside force. They frustrated the attempts of Mughal emperors to bring the Yusufzai country under their direct control. In the same way, with the help of Afghan government, they opposed the arrival of British in their area and remained a constant source of tension for them. The instructions and assistance from Kabul to rulers and Maliks of Dir state, continued even after the creation of Pakistan (Caroe, 1958).

British under the agreements of Amritsar and Lahore took possession of the frontier territory from Sikhs in 1849 (Caroe, 1958). British observed that there was a strong nexus between the Eastern Pakhtun tribes and Afghanistan, crossing border was continual, and both socially and economically the people seemed as one. Due to undetermined border, the Afghan ruler claimed the allegiance of Eastern Afghan tribes. The British, therefore, developed a mechanism for dealing with these tribes. They appointed Deputy Commissioners, each officer was made responsible to deal with the tribes bordering his district on his own. (Baha, 2017). The direct British involvement in the remote land of Dir was partially due to the conduct of the tribes and

partly to counter the Russian advances in to Pamir region (Caroe, 1958).

### **Afghan Allowances and Majibs to Local Maliks**

Before the British entry into Malakand Division in 1895, it was a routine of the tribal chiefs of Dir, Swat and Bajaur to pay visits to Kabul, where they would receive grants of money from the Amir and participated in Jashn-i-Nauroz (New Year Celebrations). The Khan of Nawagai, Safdar Khan, received huge amount of about 13,000 annually, whereas small allowances were paid to headmen in Dir and Swat which continued even after the British arrival in the area (Caroe, 1958).

After the demarcation of Durand Line, the number of allowances were decreased but to some important men the payment continued. The notables who continuously received the grants included Haji Mir Zaman, a Shamozaï Uthman Khel, who received 2000 to 35,00 Kabuli per annum and the Khan of Jhar, Fateh Muhammad Khan, received 2000 per annum. In 1895, Adam Khan, Arbab Khan and other notables from Malakand visited Afghanistan and applied to Amir for renewal of their allowances (Ramsay, 1991).

Besides that, there were several men from Dir who due to family feuds or other reasons had migrated to Afghanistan, they had been obliged by offering maintenance and received kind treatment from the Amir. The most important among the migrated families were that of the Umara Khan, the ruler of Jandul. Moreover, the brother of the Nawab of Dir, Inayatullah Khan, also migrated and resided in Kabul and received allowances 6000 per annum. Apart from the grants, the Afghan government had hired many men as Afghan spies and News writers in Dir, Swat and Bajaur (Asar, 2017).

### **Umara Khan's Attack of British Army**

Umara Khan (1860-1903), the son of Aman Khan was a courageous man who fought odd ends and has preserved his name in the annals of history. Umara Khan, succeeded in occupying throne of Jandul in 1880 (Younghusband, 1910). After establishing himself at Jandul, Umara Khan turned his attention towards Dir. By that time Muhammad Sharif Khan ruled Dir as Khan of Dir. After completing preparations, he attacked Dir at the head of a large army. He defeated and expelled Sharif Khan and incorporated Dir state into his rule (Shahid, 2007).

Umara khan had personal relations with Afghan King Abdur-Rehman. One of the daughter of Umara khan had been betrothed to Nasrullah khan, the son of King. The English Government of India was looking with great anxiety and potential repercussion to this relationship. And in order to wean the family of King from siding with Umara khan, Nasrullah was invited by Queen Victoria of England, to participate in the annual Golden Jubilee celebrations, as a trick of diplomacy (Ramsay, 1991).

When the war between Russia and England was imminent in 1885, the British Indian government despatched a mission to Chitral via Gilgit. The mission after spending one year in Chitral was successful in establishing closer ties with Mehtar of Chitral. From then onward the British communicated with Chitral state from Gilgit side through Shandur pass. The shortest route through Dir over Lowari pass into Chitral was unknown to the British. In 1895, the Chitral relief campaign, however, necessitated the British intervention in Dir (Caroe, 1958). In 1895, Umara khan of Dir had besieged British officers in Chitral. The British at Chitral, Gilgit and Peshawar issued warnings to Umara khan but he ignored them and continued the siege of Chitral fort which had started on March 3, 1895. This made the Chitral relief campaign necessary. While most of the British officials had no information of the impending despatch of force against Umara khan until 11 March, the Amir of Afghanistan and Hadda Mullah, and all the tribes knew very well about it (Thomson, 2012).

The British before dispatching the force made a proclamation to the tribes informing them of the causes of their passage through their area to Chitral. In alliance with Sharif Khan, the former ruler of Dir, the British brigades from Mardan marched to Dir against Umara Khan. On their way, they were attacked in Thana, Chakdara and Munda by the local people. On March 17<sup>th</sup>, the British forces entered Jandul, where in Munda a final engagement took place and on the following night Umara khan fled to Afghanistan. In all the engagements with Umara Khan's forces, the British observed that Afghan soldiers in uniforms were present and most of them were killed (Thomson, 2012).

On entering the Munda fort, the British found the letters sent by Afghan government promising military assistance to Umara khan against the British. Hadda Mullah and Afghan officials were doing their best to induce the tribes against the British throughout the campaign. The Afghan Amir allotted land to Umara Khan where he lived till his death in 1903. Before his death, the rumours of Umara Khan's return

with the support of Amir to Jandul were of daily occurrence. Following this episode, the Malakand Agency or the Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral was formed by the British. The history of Frontier revolt of 1897 reveals how the Agency was used by the Afghan officials (Younghusband, 1910).

### **The Role of Afghanistan in the Frontier Uprising of 1897**

The tribes of Dir and Bajaur were more cognizant of the outside events than before and the reason was that Amir Abdur-Rehman (r.1880-1901) was influencing the affairs of the Frontier. Tribal delegations were frequently invited to Kabul, troops had been kept near border and provocative pamphlets were distributed. On the directives of Afghan Amir, Hadda Mullah in Mohmand Agency, Palam Mullah in Dir, and Mullah Mastan in Swat, declared Jihad against the British in the area. The vitriolic teachings of these Mullahs had made aware the tribes of the distant new worlds (Churchill, 1898).

The centre of the uprising was Malakand and Mohmand Agency, but the intensity with which it had been started, the whole tribal and surrounding areas also felt the tremors of this revolt against the British. For the priestly classes, so many in this country, Malakand Agency proved to be a launching pad for fostering any fanatical or political intrigue (Churchill, 1898). The revolt had been started on the advice and instruction from the Afghan Amir, the British held the following religious leaders responsible for the initiation of uprising in the North West Frontier. According to the British chronicles the principal instigator of the uprising of 1897, was Hadda Mullah (Najim-ud-Din), who belonged to a village, Hadda in Jalalabad. As a disciple of the Akhund of Swat, he had shifted from there with Amir's covert consent to wage Jihad against the British. He had a large following in Dir, Bajaur, Swat, Asmar, and Jalalabad and was residing at Chmarkand, in Bajaur. The Afghan Amir, Habibullah was one among his devoted followers (Fakhrul-Islam, 2017).

The most important religious person in Dir in 1897 was Palam Baba, who had been dwelling at a village, Palam near Darora. Palam Baba was basically a native of Afghanistan and a devoted follower of Hadda Mullah. He missed no opportunity of pouring invective upon the British and always preached a vehemently anti-British sermon. He supported Sadullah, popularly known as Mullah Mastan or Sartor faqir in his struggle against the British. In the spring of 1897, Hadda Mullah had made great endeavours to bring about a simultaneous uprising in alliance with Mullah Mastan, the Mianguls of Saidu, and Said Akbar of

Tirah against the British. However, disappointed with failure of other Mullahs to start Jihad, Mullah Mastan raised the standard of Jihad and swept down on Malakand. He took the British by surprise and provided some of sternest and hardest fighting the British had known on the North West Frontier (Marwat, 1997). During the revolt of 1897, Palam Mullah prepared the people of Dir in favour of Mullah Mastan and Hadda Mullah against the British. Besides that, there were numerous other religious leaders who worked for Afghan government against the British. To deal with the rebellious tribes, the British government had deployed 40,000 to 75,000 troops to the tribal area (Marwat, 1997).

Similarly during the Third Anglo-Afghan war, the support of the Eastern Pakhtun tribes was sought by the Afghan government. In 1919, Nadir Khan was made Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), who convened meetings of the tribal which was attended by leading Maliks from North West Frontier. He, to a great extent had succeeded in forging unity amongst the Eastern tribes against the British (Rashid, 2002). Nadir Khan believed that due to Afghanistan's proximity with Soviet Union, the only option was to be friendly with them and on the other hand, in case of any threat from British India the Eastern tribes could be used as the main defence weapon against them. (Rashid, 2002).

### **Tribal Contacts with Afghanistan after Independence of Pakistan**

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, in order to gain support for Pakhtunistan, King Zahir shah increased his influence on the tribes and Mullahs of tribal area of Pakistan. The Afghan government established contacts with leading Maliks so that tribes could be used against Pakistan. On the other hand, keeping in view the past influence of Afghan Government over the Pakhtun tribes, the Indian government utilised Afghanistan's services to destabilise Pakistan. They supported and financed the Afghan claim of independent Pakhtunistan. With Indian support, the Afghan government started an intensive propaganda dubbing Pakistan as a British puppet and India as a legitimate country. Moreover, it stated that for gaining independence, India was ready to help the Pakhtun tribes by providing loans to be distributed amongst them (Rashid, 2002).

### **Nawab of Dir and Khan of Jandul, Allowances and Majibs**

To keep the Khans of Bajaur in his hand and to encourage them to work for Afghan government, the Nawab of Dir, Shah Jehan, distributed money and paid regular allowances to the Khan of Pashat,

Nawagai, Khar and Kota including Uthman Khel tribes. In 1960s, all the Khans of Bajaur worked under the instructions of Afghan government. To keep the situation in favour of Afghanistan in Bajaur, the Afghan government paid in cash and arms to the Nawab of Dir (Rashid, 2002).

### **Afghan Army Enters Bajaur and Pakistani Forces repulse them**

For connecting Khar, headquarter of Bajaur with Munda, a road project was started by the government of Pakistan. Shah Jehan, under instruction from Afghanistan instigated the Uthman Khel Shamozaais against the project. On hearing of the tension between the Government of Pakistan and Uthman Khel tribes, the Afghan government moved its forces to Chagha Srail and Asmar. To boost the morale of tribes, Afghan troops infiltrated into Bajaur on 23 September 1960. Sardar Daud twice visited Chagha Srail, where Ghulam Farooq, Governor of the Eastern provinces was conducting the operation against Pakistan. However, Pakistani forces effectively tackled the situation and repulsed the attack (The Heros of Bajaur, 2017).

Immediately after the episode, apprehensions of Nawab of Dir of his removal increased, hence, he turned towards Afghanistan. Shahb-u-Din Khan, the chief of Jandul along with Badshah Gul, a leader of the Pakhtunistan Movement, secretly visited Afghanistan. They called on Sardar Daud and apprised him of their apprehension. Sardar Daud assured them of their full support in case of clash with the government of Pakistan. However, the Nawab of Dir, Shah Jehan was arrested and taken to Lahore in 1960 (Rashid, 2002).

### **Participation of the People of Dir in Afghan Jihad**

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, USA started supporting Mujahideens (Islamists resistance fighters) against the Soviet forces. Later on, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan also joined USA in its efforts of training, equipping and funding Mujahideens. In collaboration with USA, training camps were established for them in tribal areas of Pakistan. By combining different Afghan Jihadi factions, a coalition of Mujahideen was formed which was supported by USA in her allies. Apart from Afghans, a countrywide campaign for recruitment of fighters was launched in Pakistan. In partnership with religious political parties and *Ulemas*, this purpose was best served as they easily recruited students from madrassas, schools and colleges for Afghan Jihad (Sial, 2013).



As a result, a large number of tribesmen from Malakand Division had also crossed over to Afghanistan and fought alongside the Mujahideen against the Soviet forces. Tribesmen of Dir under the umbrella of many Jihadi organizations had fought against the Soviet troops and paved the way for their withdrawal from Afghanistan (Maula, 2019).

In the same manner, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, reviving the old tradition of cooperation with Afghans, Sufi Muhammad under the banner of Tahrik-Nifazi-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), led a contingent of thousands of tribesmen for Jihad to Afghanistan. They wanted to help the Taliban government against the USA-led NATO forces. However, as majority of them were untrained and poorly equipped, many of them died either in US Air strikes or in fighting against the Northern Alliance (Khan N. I., 2010).

## **Conclusion**

Though, due to historical and cultural affinities, the tribes of Dir kept their relationship intact with Afghanistan. But after the independence of Pakistan, the influence of Afghan government could easily be curtailed as they had got tired of the Nawab's harsh rule. The tribesmen of Dir wanted to have their area developed at par with other districts of the former North West Frontier Province. For that reason, the tribes neither resisted the arrest of Nawab Shah Jehan nor did they protest against the merger of Dir state in Pakistan in 1969. However, the post-merger extension of an anomalous and defective judicial and administrative structure in the shape of Provincially Administered Tribal Area Regulations and half-hearted efforts of integrating the area further frustrated the people of the area.

Though, it was high time to win the tribal over by introducing effective administration but the extremely tepid response of the government towards problems of the people, left them with no other option but to continue with their old traditions. Moreover, it caused the people to adopt an increasingly radical religio-political stance which culminated in the shape of Tahrik-Nifazi-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi. While, patriotism could have been created amongst the tribals through administrative reforms which in turn would have discouraged centrifugal tendencies among them. Similarly, the identical ethnicity of the tribesmen on the both sides of the border could have been employed for normalization of relations between the two countries.

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## ANALYSIS OF INTRA-PARTY DISSONANCE AS A FACTOR IN JAMAT-E-ISLAMI'S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN 2018 IN UPPER DIR & LOWER DIR

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### Abstract

*Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP) is one of the oldest political parties of Pakistan. However historically its electoral performance has remained below par. In general elections 2018, JIP even failed to retain the constituencies in Upper Dir and Lower Dir that it had mostly been winning in previous elections. Using primary data generated through interview schedule from purposively selected ten party leaders, this qualitative study analyzes the causes and implications of intra-party rifts on the electoral performance of JIP in general elections 2018 in the two districts. Epistemologically grounded in constructivist / interpretivist worldview, the study relies mainly on the views of those who participated in the phenomenon under examination, while secondary data plays supplementary role. The data of transcribed interviews was thematically analyzed. The study finds that internal discords seriously impaired JIP's electoral performance. It highlights how party ideology gets compromised in the course of exposure to power and electoral politics. The study concludes that JIP needs to undertake a sustained change process for regaining its lost ground in the two districts in future elections.*

**Key Words:** Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, Intra-party Rifts, Political Parties, Electoral Politics, Democracy, Pakistan.

### Introduction

Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP) is one of the oldest Islamist parties and movements in contemporary Muslim world. Its influence in shaping Pakistan's constitutional identity, Islamization process and democratic history has been significant enough, recognized and well researched (Nasr, 1994; Khan, 2014; Moten, 2003; Hartung, 2013; Nasr

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1996; Nasr, 2001; Amin H. , 2016; Jackson, 2011). The founder of JIP Maulana Sayed Abul Ala Maudoodi (Maudoodi) influenced the thoughts and activism of many Muslims and leaders of Islamist movements (Jackson 2011). The Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan (AKFP), established by JIP, has been widely acclaimed for its relief, rehabilitation and other welfare services (Banu, 2009). The party is also perceived to be disciplined, cadred and organized (Malik I. , 2010; Malik A. , 2011), and untainted by corruption (Husain, 2018). Despite these attributes, there is little support for the party (Bajpai, 2011) and the party has a limited social base (Rais, 2017). While over the years JIP has lost ground to other parties in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Mardan, it has traditionally won all elections in Upper Dir and Lower Dir, except when it boycotted the elections or when it lost one odd constituency. But even in these districts JIP lost all but only one Provincial Assembly (PA) constituency in the 2018 general elections. One significant phenomenon observed was that several influential people left JIP at the critical point when general elections 2018 were ahead and the party could not afford desertions. This study seeks to analyze the dynamics of such desertions and their impact on the electoral performance of JIP in 2018.

### **Research Questions**

- i. Why desertions of influential people from JIP took place prior to 2018 general elections in Upper Dir and Lower Dir?
- ii. Why couldn't such desertions be averted under the circumstances?
- iii. How the phenomenon of desertions impacted the electoral performance of JIP in the two districts?

### **Objectives of the Study**

The study specifically seeks to serve the following aims and objectives.

- i. Highlighting the causes that led to the desertions of several influential persons from JIP in the lead upto the general elections 2018.
- ii. Assessing the impact of these desertions on the electoral outcome for JIP.
- iii. Ascertaining why such desertions could not be averted.

### **Literature Review**

As (Nasr S. V., *Ahya-e-Islam Aur Siasi Amal*, 2013) As

There is sizable literature on JIP. Scholars have dilated on different aspects of JIP, from its founder Maudoodi to its ideology, organization, role and contribution to state and society in Pakistan, as well as its electoral trajectory. Ahmed (2012) and Jalal (2008) have dilated on JIP's role in the Afghan-Soviet war while Haqqani (2005) has discussed the party's role Kashmiri resistance movement. Banu (2009) deals with the welfare work that JIP has been rendering. In his exhaustive research works on JIP, Nasr (1996; 2001; 1994; & 2013) has extensively discussed several dimensions of the party, underscoring the reasons for its inability to succeed in electoral politics. Calling JIP hierarchical Islamist party, Khan (2014) observes that as incumbent, the party's political calculations and strategies are "driven by political expediency rather than by ideology" (p.149). Haqqani (2005) calls JIP as cadre-based and "the most well organized and internationally visible political party" (pp.26-27) but its followers have remained small.

Amina Jamal finds that "elections continue to suggest that the majority of voters in Pakistan vote on the basis of linguistic or ethnic affiliation and practical interest" (Jamal, 2013, p.289). Moten (2003) believes that JIP has transformed beyond its original identity over the years in its vying for popular support. Afridi, Ullah, & Gul (2016) find that during its electoral politics from 1987 to 2009 JIP has moved from ideological politics towards social justice oriented politics. However, several writers have pointed out issues that plague JIP's ability to achieve its goals, including electoral success. Some of the faultlines in JIP highlighted by writers include lack of adequate accountability (Yusaf, 2020; Butt, 2013) dearth of quality leadership (Ansari, 2013; Butt, 2013), boycotting elections (Ansari, 2013; Chishti, 2013), politics of alliance (Hamid, 2013; Muhammad, 2015), aversion to criticism and public debate (Amin, 2013; Ansari, 2013; Butt, 2013), over-indulgence in politics at the cost of ideological work (Hamid, 2013; Amin 2013; Ansari, 2013), limited appeal and access to the masses (Ansari, 2013; Hamid, 2013; Nasr, 2013), and rigid organizational structure (Amin 2013; Butt, 2013). There is, however, not much work that focusses on the impact of the intra-party rifts on JIP's electoral performance in general elections 2018 with special reference to its stronghold constituencies in Upper Dir and Lower Dir. With this fact in hindsight, the instant study seeks to fill up the gap in existing literature on JIP.

### **Methodology**

This is a qualitative study epistemologically grounded in interpretivist /constructivist worldview that posits that reality is socially

constructed and construed (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Howell, 2009), and as such the researcher relies on the participants' view of the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative study is more suitable for interpretative analysis (Peters, 2013). As a qualitative study, addressing the "how" and "why" questions, it focuses on examination and explanation of a phenomenon through description of the context in light of the personal observations of the respondents who remained involved in the events, processes, and the organization of JIP. The choice of Upper Dir and Lower Dir as well as sample was purposively made because, as Creswell (2009) observes, in qualitative research sites and participants are purposively selected to help understand the phenomenon and address research questions. The two districts were considered JIP's strongholds where the party previously won many elections but lost all but one PA constituency in 2018.

Population sampling is based on three considerations, as suggested by Ritchie, Lewis & Elam (2003): first, centrality of the subpopulation to the issue under study; second, the population's ability to provide rich relevant information; third, additional sub-populations holding different views to bring supporting or divergent insights. With these considerations in view, the sample for this study comprises a total of ten individuals, eight male and two female, from the two districts who remained either party office bearers at district level (viz. Presidents or General Secretary) or who remained party candidate in national, provincial or local elections. Because of their strategic location (Gerson & Horowitz (2002) party leaders have first-hand knowledge about the dynamics of the party's electoral politics and can "accurately describe...what happened and why" (LaPorte, 1975, p.185). The respondents were interviewed using interview schedule as "in-depth personal interviews with elite members are a widely used method" (Semenova, 2018, p. 75). The data generated through interviews was then transcribed in MS Word, and thematically analyzed using MS Excel. Themes and patterns were identified and the link among them, finding answers relevant to the research questions as suggested by Willig (2014). Following Creswell's (2009) suggestion, the data so collected in the field was lent support from secondary data, chiefly published works on JIP and data of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).

### **Analysis**

Barring elections that JIP boycotted or rare cases when one odd of its candidates lost election, JIP has been a dominant party in Upper

Dir and Lower Dir, winning almost every general election since 1970. The ECP data shows that JIP won the NA constituencies from these districts in 1970, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1992, 2002, and 2013 general elections, losing only once in 1990 (ECP, 2018). Similarly, all its PA candidates also won in previous elections barring a few cases where the party either did not field its own candidates or lost, such as PF-75 and PF 76 in 1985, PF-73 in 1988 and 1990 (ECP, 1994), and PK-97 in 2013 (ECP, 2018). In general elections 2002 and 2013 JIP made a clean sweep in Lower Dir and Upper Dir in all except one PA constituency of PK-97 Lower Dir (ECP, 2013; ECP, 2002). In 2018, however, it was JIP that was cleanly swept by other parties, leaving JIP with success in only one constituency of PK-12 Upper Dir. The fact that JIP used to win so convincingly in previous elections and lost so comprehensively in general elections 2018 is indeed both intriguing as well as worth examination to understand the dynamics of this complete reversal of fortunes for the party. Previously, neither the populism of Bhutto in the seventies nor that of Imran Khan in 2013 could defeat JIP in these districts, but in 2018 the party lost to Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). What actually wrought this unprecedented defeat for JIP in the two districts in 2018 calls for an in-depth study.

The party leaders interviewed for this study shared their views, perceptions and feelings about the process and dynamics of elections in 2018 in Upper Dir and Lower Dir. They also dilated on JIP's internal issues, trends, and events prior to the 2018 elections. These responses provided significant insights about the way JIP performed in the elections. From the role of establishment to the role of media, youth and unprecedented number of women voters in 2018, different accounts were given of the way election results came about. To quote an MPA of JIP, "The 2018 elections were the worst kind of elections in Pakistan. These elections witnessed the worst kind of engineering; rigging has taken place in them; management of these elections has also taken place." In the words of a senior member of JIP, "Using media or other things for pre-election rigging or post-election rigging or rigging in ballot box, all these things have taken place". Many JIP leaders admitted that while JIP did not have the resources to use mainstream media, it also could not utilize social media to its advantage as much as PTI and other parties did, despite the fact that JIP has a social media team. They also cited women and youth as key factors that contributed to the defeat of the party candidates.



An important phenomenon observed and reported by majority of the respondents was the desertions of party local leaders from JIP. These desertions from JIP took place while political parties were gearing up for the elections and needed unity and team work. Responses of the participants suggested that with JIP's two terms in office since 2002 several influential and ambitious individuals within the party had developed the urge to vie for share in the power. Resultantly, a tug-of-war ensued in which too many were vying for too few positions. In the ensuing struggle for power share, groupings, lobbying's, pressure tactics and other practices were resorted to. In the process, the ideals and virtues of Islamist ideology got dominated by pragmatic rational choice considerations. A District Amir observed, "There are rifts; different interest groups have emerged; there are lobbies; and they have proper rivalries among them. That thing created our disaster.... in 2018 it increased a lot." According to a losing candidate of JIP who previously remained Member Provincial Assembly (MPA) said:

To an extent there were lobbying, grouping and internal rifts because the criteria for becoming a member of JIP is relaxed then such people come into JIP who come either because of relation (*Rishta*), or comradery (*Malgartia*), so that my support base increases. This lobbying is done so that when these persons become members then their support will be with me in securing an office (*Uhda*).

A former local leader of JIP who also remained MPA claimed, "*Amir-e-Zillah* (District President of JIP), or the *Tehsil Amir* (Tehsil level President of JIP), they are recruiting people to create vote for themselves.... Now lobbying is in process". Previously there was accountability within JIP against such activities and conduct which was found against the party constitution. However, now accountability has grown weaker due to which such acts have increased. In the words of a JIP District General Secretary, "Lobbying and campaigning have crept into JIP. It is coming from the last eight or ten years and gradually its speed is increasing. And the main reason for this rising speed is that JIP does not take quick action". Convincing for intra-party elections and positions is strictly prohibited in the constitution of JIP (JIP, 2020). A District *Amir* referred to the the moral decline among the party members resulting in acts not allowed in the constitution, "our *Arkans* are also not of that standard. There is proper convincing for seeking office; a lot more things happen in this, which are totally against the basic spirit of JIP". "Previously, people would not vie for offices and

candidature, now people do lobbying for it and try to come forward. And these things are there in other parties as well,” a senior party leader observed.

According to an MPA of JIP, “there were rifts among our own people; several people left us and joined other parties; they contested elections from there; a large number of people went away from JIP with such deserters”. JIP leaders observed that one key reason for these rifts was the award of party tickets to certain individuals to the dismay of many senior party members. Several party leaders at the local level were strongly opposed to the nomination of Sahibzada Tariqullah for NA-7, of Malik Azam Khan for PK-11, of Muzaffar Said from PK-15, of Dr. Zakirullah Khan for PK-14, of Shad Nawaz Khan for PK-13, of Saeed Gul from PK-17, to name but a few. In some constituencies even the dissenting voices fielded candidates against JIP’s nominated candidates (Dawn, 2018; TheNews International, 2018). In the words of a losing candidate and former MPA of JIP, “you might be aware that in every constituency another colleague (from JIP) had submitted nomination papers”. It was observed by a senior JIP leader that “Here due to ministries and membership, some differences emerged and those differences came up in election; they thought that this a solid vote and whoever gets the ticket will be elected, so why should not I become member instead of this other guy.” Referring to a former JIP MPA who was disqualified for his fake degree, a senior member of the party observed that the party lost two PA constituencies and one NA constituency in Upper Dir because of this one guy. Several senior members resented that the son of the same guy has been awarded ticket by the party. The *Farzand-e-Osherai* movement, seeking to vote only candidate from Osherai valley, not the candidate from Kohistan (viz. JIP’s Muhammad Ali), was a calculated pressure tactic from a former MPA to secure party ticket for his man. Under duress, the party leaders had to appease the JIP members who were behind *Farzand-e-Osherai* in lieu of withdrawing nomination papers.

A district senior office bearer opined that people left the party because “they think for their own forward movement, so the principles of JIP are then trampled. We have not trained people.” With the example of Haji Hidayatullah of Jandool Lower Dir in hindsight, he lamented that the party failed to accommodate even individuals who had rendered services for decades, and resultantly they went to other parties to try their luck. This lack of accommodation was also pointed out by a former minister of JIP, “The second category (of deserters) comprises those who did not get the political space in JIP. They wanted

to contest election from here (JIP) and wanted to play leadership role but they did not get the space, and they looked for space in some other political party.”

Some notable local leaders and supporters of JIP who deserted the party or contested against its candidates in general elections 2018 in Upper and Lower Dir include Sahibzada Sibghatullah, Malik Hayat Khan, Syed Inayat-ur-Rahman, Mr. Gul Sher, Dr. Sarbiland Khan, Maulana Aziz-ul-Haq alias “*Sharbanai Mula*” and Syed Iftikhar Shah. Each one of these individuals took with them a large number of voters causing serious dint in JIP’s vote bank, and crippling its ability to retain the constituencies it had been winning in earlier elections. Of these, perhaps the two most prominent cases are of Sahibzada Sibghatullah and Malik Hayat Khan, both from Upper Dir. Their association with JIP spanned over decades. They remained active members of Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba and subsequently remained associated with JIP. Sahibzada Sibghatullah’s father, Sahibzada Safiullah, is largely credited with establishing JIP in Dir on strong footing since the days the party was launched in the district. Yet Sibghatullah could not find space in the party under the dominating influence of Sahibzada Tariqullah. His opportunity arrived in 2018 when he contested elections from NA-7 Upper Dir as PTI candidate and defeated JIP’s Sahibzada Tariqullah by a margin of 8347 votes (ECP, 2018). The second case is that of Malik Hayat Khan who left JIP and joined Pakistan Muslim League before general elections 2018. He had twice been elected as MPA from JIP but was distraught at the decision of JIP to allot party ticket for PK-11 to Malik Azam Khan. Malik Hayat secured 4467 votes (ECP, 2018) in general elections and became the single most important cause of defeat of JIP’s candidate. Again, as in case of PK-10, in PK 11 also the desertion of a JIP long-time supporter caused not only the defeat of JIP’s candidate for PA but also contributed to the defeat of the party’s candidate for NA constituency. As vindicated by the participants, the vote of JIP that went away from JIP with Malik Hayat’s departure was one huge factor contributing to the defeat of JIP’s candidate for NA-5 Sahibzada Tariqullah. A senior office bearer of JIP admitted that JIP voters were divided between two candidates from same family, not only in PK-11 where two cousins, namely Malik Hayat and Malik Azam were contesting but also in NA-7 where two cousins namely Sibghatullah and Tariqullah were in contest.

Among the other deserters, the ANP candidate from PK-10 Upper Dir Mr. Gul Sher was previously a longtime supporter of JIP but left the party in 2018 and contested elections against JIP’s Muhammad

Ali. He secured 5230 votes (ECP, 2018) causing the defeat of JIP in this constituency. His vote also seriously harmed JIP's candidate Sahibzada Tariqullah for NA-5. In 2013 ANP had got 4262 votes (ECP, 2013) from NA-33 Upper Dir but in 2018 it got 8557 votes (ECP, 2018), partly due to the desertion of Mr. Gul Sher from JIP to ANP before general elections 2018. In Lower Dir, the JIP leaders confirmed that Mr. Azizul Haq had remained a long-time supporter of the current Amir JIP Mr. Siraj-ul-Haq in his constituency in Lower Dir and was also heading the *Ittihad-ul-Ulema* (Alliance of Religious Scholars) at the District level. Yet in general elections 2018, appealing mainly to his *Mashwani* tribal affiliates, he contested against JIP's candidate Mr. Saeed Gul and contributed to the latter's defeat. Another person Syed Iftikhar Shah, who previously used to vote JIP, stood as a candidate in general elections 2018 from PK-17 Lower Dir, securing 1427 votes (ECP, 2018) and together with the vote of Aziz-ul-Haq dampened the chances of the victory of JIP's candidate. Another longtime activist of JIP Dr. Sar Biland Khan also left the party and joined PTI to contest against JIP's Izaz Ul Mulk from PK-16. He secured 11988 votes and, although failed to win, contributed to the defeat of JIP's candidate in the constituency. His departure also created a dint in the vote bank of Mr. Siraj-ul-Haq, JIP's candidate for NA-5 Lower Dir.

Participants observed that there were many cases where even though several influential elements associated with JIP did not desert the party and did not contest elections, but became inactive and did not lend any support to the JIP candidates during the election in 2018. They had their own reasons for not supporting the party candidates. One losing candidate of JIP who also remained MPA shared his experience of how a day or two before the elections he had to visit such influential and longtime activists of JIP, beseeching them to abandon their apathy and contribute to the election campaign. In the case of PK-14, there were several party members and supporters who were disappointed that the party awarded ticket to Dr. Zakirullah Khan who had earlier left JIP and joined the party back only before general elections 2018. In PK-13 again, several influential old workers and supporters of JIP were highly resentful at the award of party ticket to Mr. Shad Nawaz Khan, a relatively less prominent name compared to many old timers. Many respondents admitted that as a result of this situation, a number of ideologically committed and longtime activists of JIP got despondent and preferred to stay on the sidelines rather than participate in the party's election campaign. These trends among the leaders, supporters and activists of JIP rendered the prospects of success for JIP's

candidates bleak. However, the exact quantification of the effect of this phenomenon is difficult.

The implications of party desertion adversely impacted JIP’s position vis-à-vis its competitors. Although not exhaustive, the table below highlights how defections of influential party activists and supporters alone impacted the electoral results of JIP’s candidates in Upper Dir and Lower Dir in general elections 2018.

Constituency	JIP Candidate	Loss Margin	Votes secured by Dissidents	Dissident Candidate	Party of Dissident
NA-5	Tariqullah	8347	66654	Mr. Sibghatullah	PTI
PK-11	Malik Azam	4418	4467	Mr. Hayat Khan	PMLN
PK-17	Mr. Saeed Gul	4036	2200	Mr. Aziz-ul-Haq	Independent
			1427	Sayed Iftikhar Shah	AAT
PK-16	Mr. Izaz Ul Mulk	2720	11988	Mr. Sar Biland Khan	PTI
PK-10	Muhammad Ali	1477	5230	Mr. Gul Sher	ANP
PK-15	Mr. Muzaffar Said	4595	631	Mr. Inayat-ur-Rahman	PMLN

Calculations and compilations based on ECP data. Different reasons contributed to the party’s inability to manage the phenomenon of party desertions within time before the elections. One main reason was the deficit of quality leadership that could timely intervene and tactfully resolve the rifts. With regard to resolving the disputes leading to desertions, a senior party leader observed that the provincial and central party leadership should have at least sorted these issues out themselves, if they were not decided as suggested by the local leadership. Timely decisions were not taken due to lack of decision-making quality in incumbent leadership. Below par leadership had trickle-down effect “leadership hierarchy below him gets useless and ineffective,” observed a senior party leader. While the higher party leadership did not solve the problems itself, the local leadership also found itself helpless, given the party’s hierarchical chain of command.

A District level leader pointed out that “still problems exists with regard to our leadership, there are great many hardships, and they are not of the level of the District (leadership) to solve.” A former MPA observed that he does not see the kind of leadership which is required. Existing literature (Butt, 2013; Ansari, 2013; Amin, 2013) also highlights leadership quality as one lingering constraint of JIP.

Participants also pointed out issues of space for potential aspirants who perceive that powers and benefits are appropriated only by some individuals to the exclusion of others. A sense of over-confidence and misleading sense of invincibility was also cited to have

inhibited leadership from adopting a more reconciliatory handling and accommodation of those influential elements who ultimately left the party. In the words of a district Amir, “One major thing in 2018 was that our victory in the 2013 elections got the better of us. Then we won the 2015 Local Government elections, which gave us a false sense of confidence that we are now there (as an established power); now we are invincible”. Participants also cited the rise of urge for power among activists due to decline of pristine quality of character and inadequate training. Together these reasons account for the party’s inability to manage the tricky issue of party desertions which in turn culminated in JIP’s worst electoral defeat in Upper Dir and Lower Dir in 2018 elections.

Majority of the participants concurred that while all is still not lost for JIP in Upper Dir and Lower Dir, the party will have to make efforts to set its house in order to regain its lost ground in the next elections. The kind of serious organizational vulnerabilities experienced by JIP in 2018 require matching strategies and leadership skills to cope with new and often conflicting pressures (Bolleyer, 2013, p. 25). Although the party’s response comes in shape of new attitudes, rules, procedures, or structures (Miles et al, 2014), change is not easy. Change is inhibited by several factors, including selective perception and ideological barriers, “despite the shock of successive electoral defeats” (Norris & Lovenduski, 2004, p.97). Several party leaders agreed that change process in JIP is a highly challenging task, beyond the capacity of the incumbent leadership. The JIP’s post 2018 election initiatives stipulated in its Long Term Strategy 2020-33 and Action Plan 2020 (Jammat-e-Islami, 2020a; Jammat-e-Islamic Pakistan, 2020) are neither specific to the two Districts nor transformational enough. Although incremental in nature, the stipulated measures, if implemented, offer some hope for the party’s future prospects in Upper Dir and Lower Dir.

## **Conclusion**

The defeat of all but one candidate of JIP in general elections 2018 in its two stronghold districts of Upper Dir and Lower Dir was quite unprecedented and intriguing for the party. Based on the interviews of the party leaders, both present and those who deserted the party before general elections 2018, and data of ECP, this study examined the dynamics and impact of desertions of local influential people on the electoral performance of JIP in these districts in 2018. The participants cited various reasons for the party’s poor performance,

including electoral engineering, role of media, youth and women voters. However, the data of ECP lent strength to the observations of the participants that internal rifts and the resulting desertions and despondency of several local party leaders and supporters contributed to the defeat of JIP candidates. Several factors contributed to this process including dearth of quality leadership, the surge of urges for power among aspirants, the lack of space to accommodate potential leaders and claimants, and a false sense of invincibility. The study concludes that although change is not easy, JIP needs to translate its envisioned initiatives in its Long Term Strategy and Action Plan to be able to regain the lost constituencies of Upper Dir and Lower Dir in the future elections.

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